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This background paper provides a comprehensive survey of the role of the media in informing and communicating climate 
change. This paper looks at how media coverage has shaped discourse and action – in complex, dynamic and non-linear 
ways – at the interface of climate science and policy. Moreover, this work explores influences of media on practices, 
politics and public opinion and understanding related to climate change. Research on these interactions are delineated 
through work that has been undertaken in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, New 
Zealand, Australia, Honduras, Mozambique,  Jamaica, Sri Lanka and Zambia, and explorations of newspaper coverage in 
forty English-language newspapers in seventeen countries, across five continents. Through these examinations of media 






What role do the media play in influencing personal, national, and international action to address 
climate change?  How much has the media covered climate change, and what is driving changes in 
that coverage?  How do climate change stories come to be reported, and who gets cited as legitimate 
sources in those stories?  What influence do the media play in forming public opinion? Very recent 
reports have acknowledged the need for foreign aid to help poor nations adapt to climate change: what 
role is the media playing in mobilizing that aid or making it less likely to materialize?  
Through time, mass media coverage has proven to be a key contributor – among a number of 
factors – that have shaped and affected science and policy discourse as well as public understanding 
and action. Mass media representational practices have broadly affected translations between science 
and policy and have shaped perceptions of various issues of environment, technology and risk 
(Weingart et al. 2000). Within the issue of climate change, two more terms need quick review and 
clarification: climate change mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation of emissions is the reduction of 
greenhouse gasses released to the atmosphere. For decades, the only aid to developing countries for 
climate change was linked to mitigation activities. To illustrate, a recent study found that when 
consistently categorized, a total of $676 million was given for energy efficiency in developing 
countries in the 1980s; in comparison, donors gave $4.54 billion for efficiency in the 1990s (Hicks et 
al. 2007). Renewable energy funding went from $1.6 billion in the 1980s to nearly $3 billion in the 
1990s. Total climate change aid of this sort rose from $2.3 billion in the 1980s to $8.4 billion in the 
1990s, a 261% increase.  Still, this constituted about 1 percent of Official Development Assistance 
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(ODA).  The top donors for this kind of climate change aid in the 19990s was the Asian Development 
Bank ($2.3billion), the IBRD ($1.4b), the Global Environment Facility ($1.1b), Japan ($1.1 b), the 
USA ($897m) and Germany ($342m).  India and China received $1.6 and $1.4 billion in climate aid in 
the 1990s.  
Adaptation to climate change has been defined by Working Group II of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change as “adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected 
climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial activities” (McCarthy et 
al. 2001; IPCC WGII 2007). That adjustment can be anticipatory or reactive, planned or grass-
roots/spontaneous, public or private. Disaster management can be either based on preparation and 
prevention or relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction (recovery) (Muller and Hepburn 2006). There is 
much debate about what counts as adaptation to climate change, how much funding is needed for poor 
nations to adapt to climate change, and on how much money is available under the Kyoto protocol and 
other aid mechanisms (e.g. Muller and Hepburn 2006). However, those seeing an important role for 
international assistance to poor countries for adapting to the climate change that they did not cause 
agree that the funding gap is enormous.  
Studies have found that the public learns a large amount about science through consuming 
mass media news (Wilson 1995). In what are conventionally regarded as ‘developed nations’, many 
polls have found that television and daily newspapers are the primary sources of information (Project 
for Excellence in Journalism 2006). For instance, a United States (U.S.) National Science Foundation 
survey of U.S. residents found that television remains the leading source of news in most households 
(53%), followed by newspapers (29%) (National Science Foundation 2004). In another U.S. poll that 
asked ‘where did you get your news yesterday’, participants most frequently also cited television 
(57%), followed by newspapers (40%), radio (36%) and internet (23%) (Pew Research Center for 
People and the Press 2006).
1 In ‘developing countries’ and more specifically in rural areas, radio has 
been a principle medium through which climate change news is communicated (Luganda 2005).
2  
Media representations have encompassed a wide range of activities and modes of 
communication. From performance art, plays, and poetry to news and debate, media portrayals have 
drawn on narratives, arguments, allusions and reports to communicate various facets of the issue. For 
instance, Liverman and Sherman examined portrayals of natural hazards in novels and films 
(Liverman and Sherman 1985). Mass media are generally considered a subset of these broader media 
practices. Mass media have been defined as the publishers, editors, journalists and others who 
constitute the communications industry and profession, and who disseminate information, largely 
through newspapers, magazines, television, radio and the internet. There have been many studies over 
the last two decades that have examined how mass media have covered a range of environmental 
issues. For example, Anderson explored interactions between news media and social movements in the 
issue of nuclear power (Anderson 1997). The intersection of mass media, climate science and policy is 
a particularly dynamic and high-stakes arena of these communications. 
Climate change mitigation and adaptation both require discussion, and for them the issues for 
media coverage and its impact differ. Mitigation is the reduction of greenhouse gasses released to the 
atmosphere, and for decades, the only aid to developing countries for climate change was linked to 
                                                 
1 The numbers add up to more than 100% because people typically access more than one news medium in a given day. 
Also, trends show that internet use as a source is on the rise. 
2 This is evidenced by initiatives to improve radio communications, such as that of a recent project by the Department for 
International Development as part of the Millennium Development Goals (Department for International Development 
(2006). Voices of change: strategic radio support for achieving the Millennium Development Goals. I. a. C. f. 
Development. London, DFID.). 
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mitigation activities. To illustrate, our recent study found that when consistently categorized, a total of 
$676 million was given for energy efficiency in developing countries in the 1980s; in comparison, 
donors gave $4.54 billion for efficiency in the 1990s (Hicks et al. 2007). Renewable energy funding 
went from $1.6 billion in the 1980s to nearly $3 billion in the 1990s. Total climate change aid of this 
sort rose from $2.3 billion in the 1980s to $8.4 billion in the 1990s, a 261% increase.  Still, this 
constituted about 1 percent of Official Development Assistance (ODA).  The top donors for this kind 
of climate change aid in the 19990s was the Asian Development Bank ($2.3billion), the IBRD ($1.4b), 
the Global Environment Facility ($1.1b), Japan ($1.1 b), the USA ($897m) and Germany ($342m).  
India and China received $1.6 and $1.4 billion in climate aid in the 1990s.  
Adaptation to climate change has been defined by Working Group II of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change as “adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected 
climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial activities” (McCarthy et 
al. 2001). That adjustment can be anticipatory or reactive, planned or grass-roots/spontaneous, public 
or private. Disaster management can be either based on preparation and prevention or relief, 
rehabilitation, and reconstruction (recovery) (Muller and Hepburn 2006). There is much debate about 
what counts as adaptation to climate change, how much funding is needed for poor nations to adapt to 
climate change, and on how much money is available under the Kyoto protocol and other aid 
mechanisms (e.g. Muller and Hepburn 2006). However, those seeing an important role for 
international assistance to poor countries for adapting to the climate change that they did not cause 
agree that the funding gap is enormous.  
The mass media plays a largely unexplored role in the future of climate adaptation aid.  We 
review here previous work that may point the way in assessing the role of media in influencing public 
opinion on assisting poor nations with adapting to climate change. This background paper surveys how 
mass media coverage has shaped discourse and action – in complex, dynamic and non-linear ways – at 
the interface of climate science and policy. Moreover, this work explores influences of media on 
practices, politics and public opinion and understanding related to climate change. In this production 
process, the paper touches on political economics of how types of media communications, as well as 
ownership and structure shape these processes. Moreover, we discuss how cultural differences 
influence national and regional differences in reporting as well as public and policy consumption of 
news. 
Building upon the framework of Carvalho and Burgess (2005), we call these steps in the media 
production and consumption process the ‘three phases’ of news production, public discourse, and 
media consumption, and personal engagement with climate change. In the first phase, large-scale 
economic and political factors shape the production of news, as do micro-scale issues like the norms 
and needs of journalists, editors, and producers. In the second phase, climate news stories compete 
with other issues for public attention and the budget priorities of public officials.  This section reviews 
the debate about Anthony Downs’ influential “Issue Attention Cycle,” considers the trajectory of 
climate news – both mitigation and adaptation – in that framework, and then proposes an alternative 
model of “Public Arenas” which provides a more accurate lens for understanding trends in reporting 
and opinion on climate change.  The third phase examines how knowledge and engagement by citizens 
with the issue of climate change.  Here we examine the difficult issue of how to report on uncertainty 
in climate science, and the influential role of climate ‘skeptics’ in paralyzing action.  Even without 
uncertainty about the human causes of climate change, people are often demobilized by feelings of 
isolation, hopelessness, powerlessness, and lack of public trust in government to effectively address 
the issues.  These issues carry into the penultimate section of the paper, which  examines the history of 
foreign aid for climate change, and reviews a series of studies on how reporting on disasters drives aid 
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agency budgeting.  The paper concludes with a review and discussion of the three phases in news 
production, public discourse, and media consumption, and personal engagement with climate change, 
and the future of funding for adaptation to climate change, in both rich and poor nations.  
 
Media and climate risk: An abridged history 
Concurrent with early studies of climate change during the 1700s and early 1800s – modern media had 
begun early stages of what was to become its rapid development. During that time, media growth 
faced constraints by a number of competing and contradictory factors, such as strong state-control over 
the public sphere, legacies of colonialism, low literacy rates and technological capacity challenges 
(Starr 2004). However, in the mid-1800s, media communications expanded their reach and influence 
tremendously in North America and Europe. Media took shape primarily as mass-circulation print 
presses in urban centers, where daily newspaper production quadrupled in 40 years, and circulation 
grew from 0.34 papers per household in 1870 to 1.21 papers per household in 1910 (Starr 2004). Thus, 
during this time, mass media outlets formed increasingly significant and powerful social, political, 
economic and cultural institutions (Starr 2004).  
Climate science and mass media first came together in coverage of climate change in the 
1930s. In the New York Times it was written, “The earth must be inevitably changing its aspect and its 
climate. How the change is slowly taking place and what the result will be has been considered…” 
(New York Times 1932, 4). Media coverage of human contributions to climate change appeared more 
clearly in the 1950s. For instance, the Saturday Evening Post published a story by Abarbanel and 
McClusky, entitled ‘Is the World Getting Warmer?’, exploring links between atmospheric temperature 
change and agricultural shifts as well as sea level rise (Abarbanel and McClusky 1950). In 1956, 
Waldemar Kaempffert wrote for the New York Times, “Today more carbon dioxide is being generated 
by man’s technological processes than by volcanoes, geysers and hot springs. Every century man is 
increasing the carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere by 30 percent – that is, at the rate of 1.1
oC in 
a century. It may be a chance coincidence that the average temperature of the world since 1900 has 
risen by about this rate. But the possibility that man had a hand in the rise cannot be ignored.” 
(Kaempffert 1956, 191). Then in 1957 – the International Geophysical Year – science reporter Robert 
C. Cowen wrote an article that appeared in the Christian Science Monitor called ‘Are Men Changing 
the Earth’s Weather?’ The article began: 
  Industrial activity is flooding the air with carbon dioxide gas. This gas acts like the glass in a  
greenhouse. It is changing the earth’s heat balance. It could bring anything form an ice age to a  
tropical epoch….Every time you start a car, light a fire, or turn on a furnace you’re joining the greatest 
weather “experiment” men have ever launched. You are adding your bit to the tons of carbon dioxide 
sent constantly into the air as coal, oil and wood are burned at unprecedented rates (Cowen 1957). 
However, in the subsequent three decades, mass media coverage regarding climate change remained 
sparse. These pieces regarding human’s role in a changing climate served to be a rare instances of 
media coverage of climate science, as well as clarity regarding anthropogenic climate change. There 
was scant newspaper, radio and television news coverage on topics such as U.S. National Academy of 
Sciences reports in the 1960s and 1970s that made repeated reference to emergent climate science, and 
links to anthropogenic sources.  
International and domestic climate policy began to take shape in the mid-1980s, primarily 
through activities of the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), the United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). In 1985, the 
Villach Conference convened in Austria to examine impacts of greenhouse gas emissions on the 
planet. Meanwhile, modern media communications were taking their present globalized form, marked 
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prominently by increased corporate concentration, conglomeration and commercialism (McChesney 
1999). Media power continued to grow, as did conflicting pressures of corporate control and 
democratic principles (Graber 2000; Doyle 2002). The three media-science-policy spheres collided in 
the mid-1980s, when media coverage of climate change science and policy increased dramatically. To 
illustrate, Figure 1 shows the quantity of ‘climate change’ or ‘global warming’ coverage in forty of the 
most influential English-language world newspapers. These newspapers cover seventeen countries 
across five continents (Table I, grouped by country of origin). Increases in coverage can be noted in 
Western Europe and North America during the times of the releases of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) assessment reports in 1990, 1995 and 2001. There are also increases in 
coverage during the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN FCCC) and the 1997 
Kyoto Protocol. A large increase in coverage was evident in Australia, New Zealand, the Middle East, 
Asia, Eastern Europe and South Africa during the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. At the meetings in Kyoto, 
Japan, registrants included 3,500 journalists from over 400 media organizations in 160 countries 
(Leggett 2001). 
Many factors contributed to the initial rise in coverage in 1988. Among them was NASA 
scientist James Hansen's testimony to the U.S. Congress in the summer of 1988. Hansen testified that 
he was “99 percent certain" that warmer temperatures were caused by the burning of fossil fuels and 
not solely a result of natural variation, and that “it is time to stop waffling so much and say that the 
evidence is pretty strong that the greenhouse effect is here” (Shabecoff 1988, A1). This dramatic 
statement served to generate substantial media coverage, and became a spectacle that signified 
solidified scientific concern for anthropogenic climate change. Moreover, the summer in which 
Hansen’s visit to the Senate took place was one marked by extreme drought and high temperatures 
throughout North America. These concomitant events were thought to sensitize many in the climate 
science and policy communities, as well as the media and public, to the issue of climate change. 
Demeritt has asserted, “the 1988 heat wave and drought in North America were arguably as influential 
in fostering public concern as any of the more formal scientific advice” (Demeritt 2001, 307). Figure 2 
takes the example of U.S. newspaper and television coverage of climate change, beginning in 1988.
3 
In the science and policy spheres, 1988 was also the year in which UNEP and WMO created the IPCC, 
and the WMO held a landmark international conference called ‘Our Changing Atmosphere’ (Gupta 
2001).
4 More specifically, Figure 3 tracks newspaper coverage of climate change and adaptation in the 
forty English-language newspapers from 1988 through 2006. Overall, according to Ungar, “what 
rendered 1988 so extraordinary was concatenating physical impacts felt by the person in the street” 
(Ungar 1992, 490). These climate change science and policy events and activities were pivotal in 
shaping media coverage from 1988 forward, during the time when multi-national media corporations 
underwent further and significant consolidation, through various mergers and acquisitions (Bagdikian 
2004).  
                                                 
3 Various studies in different countries demonstrate an increase in media coverage beginning in 1988: in the United States 
(Boykoff and Boykoff 2004), Germany (Weingart et al 2000) and United Kingdom (Carvalho and Burgess 2005). 
4 At this conference in Toronto, 300 scientists and policy-makers representing 46 countries convened, and from this 
meeting, participants called upon countries to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 20 percent or more by 2005 (Gupta 
2001). 
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Case Studies: U.S. and UK media coverage of climate change 
 
When the issue of global warming first rose to prominence in U.S. and United Kingdom (UK) 
media, the focus was on mitigation. This was fuelled by public interest generated by the recent 
policy action around chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and the stratospheric ozone hole, as well as 
political and electoral conditions in the U.S. context (Ungar 1992). For instance, when campaigning 
in 1988, presidential candidate George H.W. Bush’s rhetoric indicated that global warming was a 
serious problem. On that campaign trail, Bush vowed the administration would deal with global 
warming, promising to “fight the greenhouse effect with the White House effect” (Peterson 1989, 
A1).  In the UK context, political issues such as conflict around the coal unions influence actions of 
political conservatives like Margaret Thatcher to point to the need for mitigation action. For 
instance, a 1988 New York Times article pointed to “mounting evidence that carbon dioxide from the 
burning of fossil fuels and other industrial gases are accumulating in the atmosphere, where they 
trap heat from the sun like a greenhouse. Many scientists predict that the greenhouse effect will 
cause the earth’s temperature to rise within a century to levels unreached in human experience” 
(Shabecoff 1988, A8). Overall, coverage in the late 1980s and beginning of 1990 was also 
dominated by discussions of nuclear energy as a potential alternative to carbon-based consumption 
as well as U.S. Senate bills introduced to reduce anthropogenic GHG emissions (Weisskopf 1988). 
However, during these first three years – 1988-1990 – of a large increase in coverage of climate 
change, reports on climate change adaptation were minimal. In fact, just less than 1% of newspaper 
reports on climate change or global warming in major U.S. and UK newspapers covered issues of 
adaptation. (The U.S. newspapers examined here were the Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, 
U.S.A Today, Wall Street Journal and Washington Post. The UK newspapers were the Guardian 
(and Sunday Observer), the Independent (and Sunday Independent), the Times (and Sunday Times), 
and the Financial Times. Thirty of the 3,293 articles on ‘climate change’ or ‘global warming’ during 
1988 through 1990 in these newspapers covered ‘adaptation’ (0.9%)).  
            The beginning of the decade of the 1990s saw an increasingly complex politicization of the 
triple-interface of climate science-media-policy (Trumbo 1996; Boykoff and Boykoff 2004). This 
was attributed in part to the coalescence of a small group of influential spokespeople and scientists 
emerged in the news to refute scientific findings regarding human contributions to climate change 
(Gelbspan 1998; Leggett 2001; Schneider 2001). These people have been often called ‘climate 
contrarians’ or ‘sceptics’, and have frequently received funding from carbon-based industry 
interests. At this time and through the 1990s, government officials, who were often armed with the 
findings of the global warming sceptics, became the most cited source in prestige-press articles, 
surpassing scientists, who were the most cited source in 1988 (Wilkins 1993; McCright and Dunlap 
2003). This had a demonstrable effect on media reporting (Boykoff and Boykoff 2004; Carvalho 
2005). Over time, there has been a steady increase in coverage of climate change in the media. 
Figure 4 shows this increase in U.S. and UK newspapers from 1988 through 2006. The last four 
years particularly has been a period of more rapid increases, as demonstrated by Figure 5. In the 
UK, coverage quadrupled in ‘quality’ newspapers in 2006 as compared to 2003. In the U.S., it 
increased approximately two-and-a-half times during the same period. During these years, coverage 
of climate change adaptation also increased substantially (Figure 3). While more is not necessarily 
better, tracking quantity of coverage helps to identify key discursive phases in climate science-
policy, as captured through media attention. 
            The two largest increases in coverage in the UK took place during the periods of June-July 
2005 and September-November 2006. June-July 2005 was marked by two particularly prominent 
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phases at the science-policy interface that garnered heavy newspaper coverage: the Group of Eight 
(G8) Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, and increased scrutiny over greenhouse gas emissions from 
air travel. The second increase in coverage – September-November 2006 – can be attributed 
primarily to four interrelated events.  
1) the Al Gore film ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ was released in September, and it contributed to 
increased news reporting  
2) in October Richard Branson made his much publicized ‘donation’ of three billion dollars on 
renewable energy initiatives and biofuel research. This personalized story was widely reported. 
3) October 30 was the release of the much anticipated, discussed and criticized ‘Stern Review’
5  
4) the Twelfth Conference of Parties (COP12) meeting in Nairobi, Kenya boosted already heavy 
media coverage and linked to articles on public sentiment regarding climate policy action, such as 
the November ‘Stop Climate Chaos’ rally in London’s Trafalgar Square 
            In terms of U.S. coverage, the largest increase coincided with the end of this second period 
in the U.K – November 2006. This upsurge was associated largely also with attention paid to the 
Stern Review as well as COP12 in Nairobi. However, these events primed connected media 
coverage of U.S. federal climate policy through the news hook of the mid-term Congressional 
elections and prominent State-level climate policy action. The second largest increase in U.S. 
coverage – May-June 2006 – contributed to climate change as an election issue in November. 
Chiefly, climate policy rhetoric in the elections was catalyzed by heavy media coverage of the end-
of-May-2006 U.S. release of the film ‘An Inconvenient Truth’. U.S. newspaper reports on the film 
release spanned the News, Business, Entertainment and Style sections, thus pushing climate change 
from an ‘environmental issue’ to one garnering the attention of a wide range of interests and 
constituents, thereby permeating many political, economic, social and ‘celebrity’ issues. In addition, 
during this time the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to take on the long-awaited case regarding whether 
the Environmental Protection Agency had the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under 
the federal Clean Air Act. This case turned on whether carbon dioxide was treated as a ‘pollutant’, 
and this question – coupled with increased media attention from Gore’s film – generated an upswing 
in coverage. (On 2 April 2007, the court ruled that CO2 is a pollutant, and thus the EPA can regulate 
it). 
 
Case Studies: Media coverage of climate change in Australia, 
New Zealand, France, Germany  
 
Findings in the analyses of U.S. and UK news coverage of anthropogenic climate change are also 
congruent with undertakings in other country contexts. Analyses of media coverage of climate 
change in Australia, New Zealand, France and Germany cohere in that each study examined how 
media coverage influenced interactions between science, policy and the public. Moreover, these 
studies lay a foundation for work to be carried out in future studies of media coverage of climate 
change. 
            For instance, Hay and Israel examined media portrayals of scientific research in the South 
Australian context. They examined two local Adelaide newspapers – the Courier and the Advertiser 
– and mapped some of the complex processes and competing pressures that shape news production 
                                                 
5 Among a number of statements and findings, the Stern Review reported, “Adaptation policy is crucial for dealing with the 
unavoidable impacts of climate change, but it has been under-emphasized in many countries” (Stern, N. H. (2006). "Stern 
review the economics of climate change.").  
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(Hay and Israel 2001). Another study took up analyses of Australian media coverage of Kyoto 
Protocol negotiations in the month of November 1998 during the meeting after Kyoto in Buenos 
Aires, Argentina (COP4). This study analyzed coverage in The Australian, The Sydney Morning 
Herald, the Daily Telegraph (Sydney), The Age (Melbourne), and the Courier-Mail from Brisbane. 
Through investigations of headlines, page placement and content during this time, the study found 
that coverage is marked by significant acceptance of the political and expert voices. The study also 
found that emergent policy discussions were markedly different from the climate science upon 
which they were based McManus argued that this coverage serves as a detriment to potential public 
pressure on Australian policy actors to ratify Kyoto (McManus 2000). A final Australian study 
explored the external influence of media reports on Tropical Cyclone Justin on public understanding 
of climate change, by analyzing The Age (Melbourne), The Australian (National), the Herald Sun 
(Melbourne), the Border Mail (Albury/Wodonga), Ballarat Courier (Ballarat), the West Australian 
(Perth), Townsville Bulletin (Townsville), and the Northern Territory News (Darwin). The author 
traced mis-translations, through complex and dynamic interactions between science and the public, 
via mass media (Henderson-Sellers 1998). 
            In New Zealand, analyses of climate change science and policy were undertaken through an 
exploration of media coverage in the early 1990s. Bell’s analyses mapped the contested terrain 
between media information sources and public understanding (Bell 1994; Bell 1994). Researchers 
have also explored French media coverage of climate change, and have examined cultural factors 
that influence news production. The study examined newspaper coverage of global warming from 
1987 to 1997, and found that French coverage was focused on international relations, while U.S. 
coverage had focused on conflict between scientists and politicians (Brossard et al. 2004). This work 
revealed the importance of varying ‘domestic environments’. A final example is that of research on 
German media coverage, and the relations between risk communication and discourses on climate 
change in science and policy. This study undertook discourse analyses of media coverage in twenty-
three publications from 1975 through 1995, including Der Spiegel, Die Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, and Suddeutsche Zeitung. This work mapped interactions between science, policy and 
media, and illustrated the dynamic, or ‘unstable’ and contested discourses unfolding within and 
between them, thereby influencing public understanding and engagement in climate change action. 
They concluded, “in the German discourse on climate change, scientists politicized the issue, 
politicians reduced the scientific complexities and uncertainties to CO2 emissions targets, and the 
media ignored the uncertainties and transformed them into a sequence of events leading to 
catastrophe and requiring immediate action” (Weingart et al. 2000, 280).  
            Overall, through examinations in various country contexts, these studies have sought to more 
carefully examine the role of the media in climate change science and policy, through empirical 
examples of key factors and interactions at this interface. Each study has contributed to mapping the 
contours of interactions between science, policy and practice, via mass media representations. 
 
Factors that influence discourses on climate via the media 
 
Interactions between climate science, policy, media and the public are complex and dynamic. It is 
clear that science and policy shape media reporting and public understanding, however, it is also true 
that journalism and public concern shape ongoing climate science and policy decisions and activities. 
While journalists have consistently viewed their role as one of information dissemination rather than 
education, the distinction between these roles becomes blurred in practice. A ‘circuits of 
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communication’ model in reference to media and environment issues is one developed by Carvalho 
and Burgess. It provides a useful way to consider these complex processes of media coverage and 
science-policy interactions as well as personal understanding of climate change (Figure 6). It is 
important to point out that this model holds for both mitigation and adaptation aspects of climate 
change coverage; however, the focus for our purposes here is largely on adaptation. This model 
illustrates three ‘phases’ or ‘circuits’ through which communications pass over time (Carvalho and 
Burgess 2005). Media communications originate and disseminate into the public sphere before 
entering the private sphere of individual engagement. While all humans are implicated to varying 
degrees in contributing to sources of greenhouse gas emissions – through household activities, 
engagement in industrial activities through consumption, transport – those experiencing concentrated 
impacts are much fewer. So while responsibility is diffuse, subsets of more vulnerable human groups 
feel the concentrated costs (Lowi 1972). Thus, the media representations that originate and compete 
for attention in this public sphere are taken up to varying degrees in our personal lives, and feedback 
again through ongoing media practices over time. These feedbacks shape news framing in subsequent 
phases, and inform ongoing climate science, policy and practice interactions over time. Overall, media 
coverage of climate change – both mitigation and adaptation – takes place in the larger context of 
regulatory frameworks, political constraints and economic drivers. Cultural as well as regional and 
national differences too contribute to differences in how these interactions take place. The factors all 
contribute to the ways in which climate change is communicated via media representations.  
 
THE FIRST PHASE of news production: framing, power and the power of framing 
As depicted in Figure 6, the first ‘phase’ of communication is that of the production of news. Media 
professionals – such as editors and journalists – produce news within a political, economic, 
institutional, social and cultural landscape. Moreover, news coverage of climate change – both 
mitigation and adaptation – is produced through journalistic norms and values. In the production of 
news, stories are partly generated from asymmetrical power relationships, and partly developed 
through the history of professionalized journalism (Starr 2004). Socio-political and economic factors 
have given rise to distinct norms and values (Lee 2006), and these that buttress journalistic practices 
(Bennett 2002). This mobilization of power is complex, and often subtle as well as contradictory. In 
fact, discontinuities can arise in media coverage through the very professional journalistic norms and 
values that have developed to safeguard against potential abuses of asymmetrical power (Boykoff and 
Boykoff 2004). Thus, media coverage of climate change (adaptation and mitigation) is not a simple 
collection of news articles and clips produced by journalists and producers; rather, representations 
signify key frames derived through complex and non-linear relationships between scientists, policy 
actors and the public, often mediated by news stories.  
Framing is a process, and an inherent part of cognition whereby content is constructed – in the 
form of issues, events and information – to order, organize and regulate everyday life. It can be 
defined as the ways in which elements of discourse are assembled that then privilege certain 
interpretations and understandings over others (Goffman 1974). Framing permeates all facets of 
interactions between science, policy, media and the public. For instance, Roger Pielke Jr. has 
examined the policy implications of the restricted definition of ‘climate change’ by the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (Pielke Jr. 2006). The process of media framing involves 
an inevitable series of choices to cover certain events within a larger current of dynamic activities. 
These events are then converted into news stories. In recent years, more researchers from fields of 
environmental sociology, geography, political science and communications have examined framing of 
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various scientific issues (Szasz 1995; Jasanoff 2004; Demeritt 2006; Nisbet and Huge 2006). Figure 7 
depicts there interactions within journalism. 
Entman states that, “framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select 
some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a 
way as to promote a particular problem definition…” (Entman 1993, 52). Therefore, the construction 
of meaning and discourse derive through combined structural and agential components. Asymmetrical 
influences also feed back into these social relationships and further shape emergent frames of ‘news’, 
knowledge and discourse. These processes take place at multiple scales. For instance, individual 
journalists must contend with time and space pressures when reporting the news. Many are codified 
and explicit (such as column inches), while others are implicit and shaped by social convention (time-
management in covering multiple ‘beats’ sufficiently). These related decisions are made in the context 
of larger-scale pressures. While some factors like access through ownership and control are more 
readily apparent, other influences, such as journalists’ training are more concealed. The power 
dynamics that emerge from these elements then becomes re-embedded in macro-relations, such as 
decision-making in a capitalist political economy, and again micro-processes such as everyday 
journalistic practices. Overall, these norms, values and pressures are interrelated and therefore very 
difficult to disentangle. Multi-scale pressures can be considered in terms of political, economic, social, 
cultural, ethical and journalistic elements (providing the context for the ‘circuits of communication’ 
model in Figure 6).  
 
The terrain: Macro-scale influences shaping media representations of climate change  
At the macro political-economic level, in recent years media organizations – dominated by developed-
country organizations – have continued to consolidate. Efficiency and profit increasingly influence 
news production (Bennett 1996), and a number of studies have explored how economic pressures and 
ownership structures have affected news content (e.g. Herman and Chomsky 1988). McChesney has 
written, “The core structural factors that influence the nature of media content include the overall 
pursuit of profit, the size of the firm, the amount of direct and indirect competition facing the firm and 
the nature of that competition, the degree of horizontal and vertical integration, the influence of 
advertising, the specific interests of media owners and managers, and, to a lesser extent, media 
employees. In combination, these factors can go a long way to providing a context (and a trajectory) 
for understanding the nature of media content…” (1999, 31). This statement holds generally across 
different country contexts as well as across many environmental issues. However, there has been 
particularly great reliance on climate change coverage from major media organizations based in 
developed countries, due to the complex nature of physical, biological and cultural aspects of climate 
change. In other words, in smaller countries as well as those in the ‘Global South’ there are difficulties 
in funding and accessing climate science, as well as having the political leverage to institute 
cooperative actions to combat it. This has been illustrated in numerous times and cases, such as the 
unsuccessful plight of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) to make greater cuts in emissions 
than ultimately were codified in the Kyoto Protocol (Leggett 2001). Despite, aims for reductions as 
high as 80%, and personal visits to the U.S. by the president of Tuvalu to discuss the importance of 
climate change actions – both in mitigation and adaptation – the Kyoto Protocol contained overall cuts 
of merely 5.2% below 1990 levels for the Phase I group of three dozen countries (Leggett 2001). This 
case also demonstrates how perceived political economic costs – such as re-structuring of carbon-
based economy and society – are resisted. In the case of media coverage overwhelmingly framing 
these issues as ‘global’ rather than differentiated ‘luxury’ versus ‘survival’ emissions, the media 
functions as a servant rather than challenge to these interests (Agarwal and Narain 1991). By 
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‘survival’ emissions, Agarwal and Narain referred to necessary activities, such as burning wood 
(generating greenhouse gas emissions) to boil water for safe drinking. By ‘luxury’ emissions, they 
referred to activities such as driving an eight mile-per-gallon vehicle to the corner chain store to buy 
blueberries that have traveled 4,000 miles for purchase (thus ‘luxuriously’ generating greenhouse gas 
emissions in transport) (1991).  
In other research, Gilens and Hertzman have provided “systematic evidence that financial 
interests of media owners influence not only newspaper editorials but straight news reporting as well” 
(Gilens and Hertzman 2000, 383). Additionally, deadlines and space considerations constrain 
journalists (Schudson 1978). For instance, tight deadlines can lead to stories that rely on just one 
source for information (Dunwoody 1986) and they can limit the ability of journalists to both 
comprehend and communicate complex climate science (Weingart et al. 2000). Moreover, editorial 
preferences and publisher pressures can affect news reporting (Schoenfeld et al. 1979). The amount of 
exposure and placement (front page or buried deep in the newspaper), as well as the use of headlines 
and photographs – which are often editorial decisions – can also affect how events and situations are 
construed by the public. 
Economic considerations have led to decreased mass-media budgets for investigative 
journalism (McChesney 1999). This has had a detrimental effect on training for news professionals in 
covering news ‘beats’ (Gans 1979; Bennett 2002). According to research by Dunwoody and Peters, 
the typical journalist in the U.S. is “even less likely to have majored in science or math than is the 
average U.S. resident” (Dunwoody and Peters 1992, 208). While this study by Dunwoody and Peters 
focused on the U.S. context, this finding can be generalized across other countries as well. For 
instance, Harbison et al found this to be the case in analyses of media coverage in Honduras, Sri 
Lanka, Zambia and Jamaica (to be discussed further below) (2006). Speaking generally to this issue, 
University of Arizona climate scientist Malcolm Hughes has commented, “There is a huge gulf in the 
nature of the questions and concerns that come from journalists working very broadly (as generalists)” 
(Hughes 2005). This trend has served to affect communications of scientific information when 
complex scientific material is simplified in media reports (Anderson 1997). 
 
The level of the story: Micro-scale pressures shaping media coverage of climate change  
These issues begin to work across scales from macro-level political economic factors to micro-level 
processes such as journalistic norms and values intersect with these elements and shape news content 
(Jasanoff 1996). These include objectivity, fairness, and accuracy. Much as storylines are fueled 
within science and policy, the mass media play an important role, particularly as the role of translator. 
Scientists have a tendency to speak in cautious language when describing their research findings, and 
have a propensity to discuss implications of their research in terms of probabilities. Sheldon Ungar has 
asserted, “science is an encoded form of knowledge that requires translation in order to be understood” 
(Ungar 2000, 308). Moreover, scientists tend to qualify their findings in light of uncertainties that lurk 
in their research. For journalists and policy actors, these issues of caution, probability and uncertainty 
are all difficult to translate smoothly into crisp, unequivocal commentary often valued in 
communications and decision-making. For example, in peer-reviewed scientific journal articles, the 
professional culture of science trains authors to build the case of the research and then place key 
findings in the results and discussion sections; in professional media reports, journalistic norms 
instruct reporters to lead with the most important conclusions and discoveries. Therefore, scientific 
findings usually require translation into more colloquial terms in order for it to be comprehensible. As 
Weingart et al put it, “the media…tend to translate hypotheses into certainties” (2000, 274). 
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News-production conditions in this first ‘phase’ of the Carvalho and Burgess model interact in 
important ways with first-order journalistic norms: personalization, dramatization, and novelty. 
Boykoff and Boykoff call them ‘first-order’ norms, because these factors are significant and baseline 
influences on both the selection of what is news and the content of news stories (Boykoff and Boykoff 
2007). The lens of personalization focuses attention on competition between personalities struggling 
for power and acting strategically in order to improve their prestige and socio-political leverage. The 
human-interest story conforms to the idea that news focuses on individuals rather than group dynamics 
or social processes (Gans 1979). The gaze is on the individual claims-makers who are locked in 
political battle, and thus structural or institutional analyses are skipped over in favor of stories that 
cover the trials and tribulations of individuals. As an effect, these stories are seldom linked to deeper 
social analysis. This connects to dramatization. Hilgartner and Bosk write that, “Drama is the source 
of energy that gives social problems life and sustains their growth” (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988, 62). 
Dramatized news tends to downplay more comprehensive analysis of the enduring problems, in favor 
of covering the movements at the surface of events (Wilkins and Patterson 1987). Aforementioned 
scientific lexicon does not help the issue conform to this dramatization norm; in fact it makes the 
‘story’ less appealing for journalists (Ungar 2000). Moreover, the journalistic valuation of drama can 
serve to trivialize news content, as it also can lead to the blocking out of news that does not hold an 
immediate sense of excitement or controversy. However, this norm does not necessarily lead to 
reduced coverage. In their report entitled ‘Warm Words’, Ereaut and Segnit have posited that 
presenting news in this dramatized form is most common, and ‘sensationalized’ or ‘alarmist’ reporting 
“might even become secretly thrilling – effectively a form of ‘climate porn’ rather than a constructive 
message” (Ereaut and Segnit 2006, 14).  
An example of a dramatic event that generated tremendous news coverage is Hurricane 
Katrina. Despite scientific uncertainty that remains regarding links between hurricane intensity and 
frequency and climate change, this event spurred a ‘wave’ of coverage. In the U.S., Juliet Eilperin 
reported in the Washington Post, “Katrina's destructiveness has given a sharp new edge to the ongoing 
debate over whether the United States should do more to curb greenhouse gas emissions linked to 
global warming” (Eilperin 2005, A16). Considerations of links to implementation of international 
climate policy in the public domain were fuelled further in this case by comments made by prominent 
political actors. For instance, Jurgen Trittin – Minister of the Environment in Germany – commented, 
“The American president has closed his eyes to the economic and human damage that natural 
catastrophes such as Katrina – in other words, disasters caused by a lack of climate protection 
measures – can visit on his country” (Bernstein 2005, D5). 
  Dramatization intersects with the common journalistic attraction to novelty (Gans 1979; Wilkins 
and Patterson 1987; Wilkins and Patterson 1991). Pointing to the relationship between dramatization 
and novelty in the mass media, Hilgartner and Bosk assert, “saturation of the public arenas with 
redundant claims and symbols can dedramatize a problem” (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988, 71). Because 
of the perceived need for a ‘news peg,’ certain stories are deemed suitable and others are not (Wilkins 
1993). Gans asserts there is a “repetition taboo” whereby journalists reject stories that have already 
been reported in favor of news that is fresh, original, and new (Gans 1979, 169). Stocking and Leonard 
comment that this “allows persistent, and growing, environmental problems to slide out of sight if 
there is nothing ‘new’ to report” (Stocking and Leonard 1990, 40). In practice, this feeds into a 
preference for coverage of crises, rather than chronic social problems. Therefore, when it comes to 
climate-change coverage, Wilson notes, “The underlying causes and long-term consequences are often 
overlooked in the day-to-day grind to find a new angle by deadline” (Wilson 2000, 207). So a tension 
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continues between science and mass media: within established storylines of climate change, there is a 
need for novel ways to portray this story.
6 
In combination, through influences on the selection of news and the content therein, these first-
order norms initiate and inform a set of second-order journalistic norms: authority-order, and balance 
(Figure 7).  Together, these norms and influences contribute to what becomes news, and media 
coverage of climate change – both mitigation and adaptation. Previous research has argued that such 
adherence to these first- and second-order norms to ‘episodic framing’ of news – rather than ‘thematic 
framing’ whereby stories are situated in a larger, thematic context – and this has been shown to lead to 
shallower understandings of political and social issues (Iyengar 1991; Boykoff and Boykoff 2007). 
This episodic framing can then skew media coverage that affects public understanding of climate 
change mitigation and adaptation. Authority-order bias is a second-order journalistic norm where 
journalists tend to primarily, and sometimes solely, consult authority figures – government officials, 
business leaders, and others (Bennett 2002, 48-49). This highlights “the desirability of social order” 
and “the need for national leadership in maintaining that order” (Gans 1979, 52). Research has shown 
that through media coverage of climate change, there is often significant acceptance of political and 
expert voices by the public (McManus 2000). Moreover, the complex issue of public trust in authority 
figures may feed back into and influence climate policy decision-making (Pidgeon and Gregory 2004; 
Lorenzoni and Pidgeon 2006, see discussion in ‘third phase’ below). The sometimes explicit but often 
tacit drive to restore order can then serve to defuse or amplify concern about threatening social issues, 
even if such effects are not warranted.
7 Since environmental issues (such as climate change mitigation 
and adaptation) often appear in the news because of a looming or unfolding crisis, this penchant for 
authoritative – often government – sources is not a trivial matter (Miller and Riechert 2000). However, 
effects of this journalistic norm become less straightforward when there is overt contestation and 
‘dueling’ authorities clash. This leads both back to first-order norms of personalization and 
dramatization, and to the final second-order norm of balance. Balance is often seen as an activity that 
carries out the pursuits of objectivity (Cunningham 2003). With balanced reporting, journalists 
“present the views of legitimate spokespersons of the conflicting sides in any significant dispute, and 
provide both sides with roughly equal attention” (Entman 1989, 30). In coverage of climate science, 
balance can help reporters when they lack the requisite scientific background or knowledge, or are 
facing formidable time constraints (Dunwoody and Peters 1992). With coverage of climate change, the 
proclivity to personalize news dovetails in an important way with the notion of balance in that it leads 
to the scenario of the dueling scientists, who receive ‘roughly equal attention’. 
Boykoff and Boykoff (2004) quantitatively explored how the balance norm was applied to 
anthropogenic climate change in U.S. newspaper coverage. This study found that, over a fifteen-year 
period, a majority (52.7%) of prestige-press articles featured balanced accounts that gave “roughly 
equal attention” to the views that humans were contributing to global warming and that exclusively 
natural fluctuations could explain the earth’s temperature increase. Coverage was divergent from the 
scientific consensus on this issue in a statistically significant way from 1990 through 2002. These 
analyses complement findings from other studies of news production and the issue of climate change. 
For instance, McComas and Shanahan examined ongoing narratives in reporting in the New York 
Times, and the Washington Post from 1980 to 1995. They found the agenda-setting function of mass 
                                                 
6 These ‘new’ things are actually ‘novel ways’ of portraying or depicting already existing things, in the context of ongoing 
storylines and historicized or pre-existing norms and pressures. Hence, it is the ‘perceived need’. 
7 Events and issues are often inherently dominated by authority figures working for order. Thus, the attention here is to 
examine media representations of those traits, and is not to suggest that the appearance of elite figures on news stories is 
the sole result of journalist adherence to the ‘authority-order’ norm. 
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media as important, as well as the influences from external factors – such as dramatic events – that 
shape coverage (McComas and Shanahan 1999). In addition, Antilla examined newspaper coverage in 
255 different sources from 2003 to 2004. She found that wire services have played a key role in 
shaping the ways in which climate change science is framed and discussed in reporting (Antilla 2005). 
In the UK, Burgess put forward key foundational and conceptual work regarding the cultural 
production and consumption of meaning via the media (Burgess 1990). Anderson examined these 
cultural practices through an analysis of environmental stories, as well as their relation to public and 
policy attention (Anderson 1997). Furthermore, in 2005, Carvalho examined social, political and 
cultural struggles to frame the climate change issue in UK newspapers. This study examined three 
‘broadsheet’ or ‘quality’ UK national newspapers: The Guardian, The Independent, and The Times 
(Carvalho and Burgess 2005). The authors undertook critical discourse analysis to examine social, 
political and cultural struggles to frame the climate change issue, and analyzed these framing practices 
within the constraints of ideological parameters, maintained and perpetuated within the media sources 
themselves. Other research by Carvalho finds that through multiple feedback processes of 
communication of climate change risk via the media over time, prominent political actors successfully 
frame climate risk for their purposes, and align frames with their interests and perspectives (Carvalho 
2005). Similarly, Smith examined UK broadcast news media coverage of climate change risk, and the 
interactions between climate change science, policy, media and public spheres. Through analyses of 
seminar discussions from 1997 to 2004 by influential actors – such as BBC broadcasters – in these 
communities, he unpacked and assessed key factors that shape decision-making in the development of 
news stories (Smith 2005).  
Overall, this section has discussed the first ‘phase’ of news production of climate change – 
both mitigation and adaptation – stories. It has focused on large-scale economic and political factors 
shape the production of news, as well as smaller-scale issues such as norms and pressures that 
journalists, editors, and producers face when assembling such coverage. This leads the discussion into 
the second ‘phase’, which deals with the legibility of climate news and subsequent discussions in the 
public sphere, or ‘arena’. 
 
THE SECOND PHASE of news in the public sphere: legibility of climate discourse 
Figure 6 shows the movements of ‘texts’ or ‘form’ into the second ‘circuit’ of public dissemination. 
These encoded messages – television/radio broadcasts, printed newspapers/magazines, and internet 
communications – comprise communications that then compete in public arenas for attention. This 
coheres with the ‘Public Arenas’ model that can be nested in this second ‘phase’ of communication 
(Hilgartner and Bosk 1988) in considerations of the increases and decreases in media attention to 
climate change mitigation and adaptation. Hilgartner and Bosk’s model “stresses the ‘arenas’ where 
social problem definitions evolve, examining the effect of those arenas on both the evolution of social 
problems and the actors who make claims about them” (1988: 55). The focus here is on one such 
‘arena’ – the mass media – and analytical attention is on “the ‘principles of selection,’ or institutional, 
political, and cultural factors that influence the probability of survival of competing problem 
formulations” (1988: 56).  
  Previous attempts to theorize the rise and fall of media coverage and public concern for 
ecological issues have relied on Anthony Downs’s ‘Issue-Attention Cycle’. For instance, in mapping 
the environmental policy-making process, Roberts relies on this model to “provide an explanation of 
the waxing and waning of issues within the policy environment” (Roberts 2004, 141). More specific to 
climate change, Trumbo utilizes the ‘Issue-Attention Cycle’ to “present a brief history” of climate 
change coverage in the news and to “serve as a useful tool” for examining how climate is framed in 
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the media (Trumbo 1996, 274). In terms of ‘agenda-setting’ of climate change discourse through the 
media, Newell leans on this model as an “all-embracing explanation for the nature of media coverage 
of global warming”, despite acknowledgement that the model fails to “accurately depict the 
complexity and challenging nature of the climate change problem” (Newell 2000, 86). 
In describing the ‘Issue-Attention Cycle’ Downs posited that public attention to environmental 
issues moves through five sequential stages. First is the “pre-problem stage”, when an ecological 
problem – such as anthropogenic climate change risk – exists but has yet to capture public attention. 
Downs posits that expert communities are aware of the risks, but this has not yet been disseminated 
more widely. In the case of media attention of climate change mitigation and adaptation, this might be 
considered the conditions before 1988, where there were just four stories across forty newspapers in 
the decade before. The second phase is that of “alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm,”, where 
dramatic events make the public both aware of the problem and alarmed about it. The aforementioned 
events of the late 1980s can help explain how there were increased ‘hooks’ for climate change stories. 
Third, is the “gradual-realization-of-the-cost stage” where key actors acknowledge sacrifices and costs 
that will be incurred in dealing with the problem. One could argue that this characterization might 
coincide with the emergence of a cohesive group – since called ‘climate contrarians’ – that began to 
challenge scientific findings regarding the presence of an anthropogenic climate change signal.  
Fourth, is the “gradual-decline-of-intense-public-interest stage” where, according to Downs, actors 
become discouraged at the prospect of appropriately dealing with the issue, and crises are normalized 
through suppression and in some cases boredom. It could be argued that this might coincide with the 
slight decrease in coverage of climate change adaptation in the mid-1990s (Figure 3) and climate 
change more generally (Figure 1). Finally, fifth is the catchall “post-problem stage”, where the 
formerly ‘hot’ issue “moves into a prolonged limbo – a twilight realm of lesser attention or spasmodic 
reoccurrences of interest”. In this stage, Downs covers all possibilities when he states that the issue 
“once elevated to national prominence may sporadically recapture public interest” (1972, 39-41). 
Scholars have analyzed media coverage of climate change through this model, periodizing media 
coverage of global warming into distinct phases (e.g. Trumbo 1996; McComas and Shanahan 1999). 
This cycle is argued to be “rooted both in the nature” of the problem and in the “way major 
communication media interact with the public” (Downs 1972, 42). 
This ‘natural history’ framework is useful perhaps in considering the intrinsic qualities of the 
issues themselves that influencing these ebbs and flows of coverage. Yet, the Downs model does not 
capture the contested terrain upon which ‘alarm’ and ‘costs’ are determined and contested, nor does it 
account for the non-linear factors that shape dynamic interactions between climate science, policy and 
the public via the mass media (Williams 2000).  Logan and Molotch (1987), describe the “easy news” 
and the “hard news” to report upon (“if it bleeds, it leads”), and the difficulty reporters face when 
raising issues which might threaten their advertisers or owners’ news. Dunlap argues that 
environmental issues have not conformed to Downs’ Issue-Attention Cycle, since the problems have 
worsened, new problems have arisen, and most importantly, professionalized social movement 
organizations have been built to keep them alive (1992). Critics have also made the point that cycles 
may have both sped up in recent years, as well as become less apparent (Jordan and O'Riordan 2000). 
Moreover, cross-cultural research has found evidence that while the Downs model appears to hold in 
some contexts, it does not hold in others (Brossard et al. 2004). In sum, this model is left wanting in 
that it is too partial an explanation, as well as too linear and rigid an interpretation, of the messiness 
multiple internal as well as external factors shaping climate science-policy/practice interactions. In 
terms of media coverage influencing public attention, understanding and engagement, it does not 
account for how the aforementioned journalistic norms such as personalization, dramatization and 
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balance could under gird what becomes news, rather than just the issue itself. Therefore, the 
entrenched use of this Downs model has been detrimental in considerations of how these media 
representations are constructed, thus contributing to possible impediments to greater climate change 
mitigation and adaptation in the public purview. 
Considering the ‘Circuits of Communication’ and ‘Public Arenas’ models together enables 
examinations of both intrinsic and extrinsic factors – as well as dynamic and non-linear influences – 
that shape media coverage of both mitigation and adaptation. This helps move analyses beyond static 
representations to more accurate analytical lenses for understanding current trends, strengths and 
weaknesses in media coverage of climate change – both mitigation and adaptation. In this ‘Public 
Arenas’ model, there is accounting for dynamic and competitive processes to define and frame the 
‘problem’, and understanding of the institutional arenas that serve as “environments” where social 
problems compete for attention/grow (like the contexts described in the ‘Circuits of Communication’ 
model). Furthermore, there is acknowledgement of the ‘attention economy’ (Ungar 1992) that brackets 
the quantity and quality of all aspects of climate change coverage at a given time. There is also 
consideration of how various political, institutional and cultural factors – as well as actor networks, or 
‘claims-makers’ – compete for the framing and selection (as well as de-selection) of mitigation and 
adaptation considerations. Media studies researchers have asserted that, “Journalists are less adept at 
reporting complex phenomena… (and) have difficulty reporting stories that never culminate in 
obvious events” (Fedler et al. 1997, 94). Moreover, journalists often focus reporting on events, which 
thus underemphasize these ‘creeping’ stories as well as the contexts within which they take place 
(Dunwoody and Griffin 1993). While scientific insights regarding complex issues such as 
anthropogenic climate change and adaptation evolve over years and decades, through journalistic 
norms and pressures, media take ‘snapshot’ selections from this steady stream of enhanced 
understanding, thus providing truncated interpretations. This feeds back into the production ‘phase’ of 
the ‘circuits’ model, where challenges such as time-scale are not compatible with news conventions 
(Carvalho and Burgess 2005). Above all, thinking through how these models account for these 
processes should be useful in considerations of increased media coverage of climate change coverage 
(including adaptation) in the last two years, as well as the crucial role that mass media plays in public 
understanding and engagement with the climate change issue. 
Amid this increase in coverage in the last two decades, it has only been in recent years that 
media coverage of climate adaptation has increased substantially. Figure 3 shows results from a search 
using the keywords ‘climate change’ or ‘global warming’ and ‘adaptation’. This was conducted in 
forty of the most influential English-language world newspapers (congruent with Figure 1) (see Table 
I). There were increases evident during the times of the IPCC assessment reports in 1990, 1995 and 
2001, as well as during the times of the UN FCCC in 1992 and the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. Outside of 
Europe and North America, coverage of climate change or global warming and adaptation is 
considerably lower. Moreover, coverage that does appear in many of the newspaper outlets are often 
reproduced news stories from Europe and North American sources. For instance, most coverage that 
appeared in the Yomiuri Shimbun was repurposed material from the Washington Post, and the Los 
Angeles Times in the US, as well as the Independent from the UK. Further distinguishing between 
what are conventionally considered ‘developing’ countries, from this initial sampling of forty 
newspapers, there is scant coverage of climate change/global warming and adaptation over the last two 
decades.
8  
                                                 
8 The ‘East Asian tigers’ China/Hong Kong and Korea have been considered ‘developed’ countries by the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund, while South Africa, Malaysia and Thailand have been considered ‘emerging economies’ 
Thus, this grouping may not be representative of ‘developing countries’. Nonetheless, this demonstrates reduced coverage 
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In regards to media reporting of climate change adaptation in developing countries, the PANOS 
Institute has produced an illuminating study (Harbinson et al. 2006). Through surveys of forty-seven 
print, radio and television journalists from Honduras, Jamaica, Sri Lanka and Zambia, this study found 
that there has been little interest by editors and journalists to cover adaptation issues related to climate 
change. Such little coverage, according to those interviewed, included “migration to the cities…using 
air conditioning…renewable energy projects or recycling schemes…irrigation and seed saving…fuel 
use change and tree planting projects” (4). Consistently, interviewees cited three main reasons for this 
across all four countries:  
1)  low levels of knowledge of the issue: this was linked to a lack of access to “timely, clear and 
understandable information on climate change” as well as the ways that “scientists, NGOs and 
institutions us(e) excessive jargon” in communicating the issue (5) 
2)  insufficient financial resources: this resulted in constraints on first-hand reporting, as well as 
allocation of time to certain ‘green’ news beats; for instance, a Honduran reporter commented 
“I would love to…work only on nature issues…but the press does not give me the opportunity” 
(9) 
3)  incongruent habits and priorities: connected to the first two points, this refers to the penchant to 
cover stories of crime and violence “primarily because these issues ‘sell’ and so are preferred 
by editors and advertisers” (5) 
Thus, multiple challenges face media reporting on climate, and these pressures can be externally 
imposed (such as political economic advertising revenue pressures) or internally generated (through 
the development and application of professional journalistic norms and values). In this public sphere, 
these challenges are also met with the competitive nature of information dissemination. In other 
words, there are many issues and problems represented in the public sphere by media coverage, and 
the issue of climate change is one among many that deserves both attention and action. Overall, in the 
second phase, we have described how climate news stories – both mitigation and adaptation – compete 
with other issues for public attention and as well as engagement and action.  In working through these 
complex and dynamic factors, we reviewed two influential organizing models: Downs’ ‘Issue 
Attention Cycle’, and Hilgartner and Bosk’s ‘Public Arenas Model’. These models help to make sense 
of trends in reporting and attention in the public sphere.   
 
 
Honduras Case Study: The Perfect Storm 
 
As a more specific analysis of one of these countries, we look to media coverage of climate change in 
Honduras, centered on the 1998 disaster surrounding Hurricane Mitch, which made landfall on the 
North Coast of the country in October 1998. While scientific research is still debating the extent of 
connections between hurricane intensity and frequency and climate change, Mitch prompted 
widespread speculation and discussion in climate policy and public circles. Though it would be 
impossible to say that global warming caused any single hurricane, the increase in air and water 
temperatures undoubtedly increases the evaporation and energy in the climate system. The devastation 
from the hurricane event provided a news hook through which many journalists explored the complex 
nexus of interacting natural forces and potential human influences. Despite scientific caution on the 
topic, this event sparked many media reports to consider human activities in relation to this event as 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
in what have not long been considered ‘developed countries’ and coverage is reported to be further diminished in more 
representative ‘developing’ countries. 
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well as future storm events and climate change adaptation. 
The fact that the poorest and most vulnerable countries suffer worst from climate disasters is 
illustrated dramatically by this case. In this country of 6.3 million people, 53% live in poverty, and 
30% in extreme poverty (CEPAL 1999). The story of Hurricane Mitch in Honduras serves as a 
parable about uneven vulnerability to global climate change, whether present or likely for the future 
(Cutter 1997; Rodgers 1999; Wisner 2001; Roberts and Parks 2007).  
Much like a bomb detonator in an already volatile environment, Hurricane Mitch – a storm 
that dumped six feet, or one normal year’s worth, of rain in two days – arrived in the fall of 1998 in an 
area of highly explosive social, economic, environmental and institutional conditions. To be fair, the 
strength of the storm was unprecedented. However, socioeconomic vulnerability, institutional 
fragility, and poor natural resource management practices seriously magnified the effects of the 
disaster. Carlos Medina, the former environment minister of Honduras, estimates that deforestation 
intensified the effects of Hurricane Mitch by at least 30%. Due to extraordinarily high levels of 
deforestation, when the rains came down, so did the topsoil from the denuded uplands, leading to 
more than one million landslips and mudslides and monstrous flooding that engulfed entire towns and 
wiped out much of the region’s infrastructure (Comfort et al. 1999; Morris et al. 2002; Lavell 2002).  
As torrential rains poured down the mountains and hillsides, rivers swelled uncontrollably, in some 
cases as much as 30 feet higher and 1500 feet wider. The River Choluteca burst its banks near one of 
the nation’s larger cities, “creating . . . an eerie lagoon of untreated sewage and chemical effluents in 
which corpses flowed by” (Rodgers 1999). With only four helicopters available, the Honduran 
government faced a country where 60% of the land was engulfed in mud and water. The FAO 
estimated economic losses in the order of 80% of annual GDP (FAO 1999). The Economist 
Intelligence Unit (2004) estimates that damages were closer to 95% of Honduras’ GDP. Half of the 
country’s agricultural production was destroyed, ninety-four bridges were destroyed, sewage and 
electricity systems were knocked out, and hospitals, schools, railways, and telecommunication 
networks were rendered inoperable. As President Carlos Flores Facussé put it, “In 72 hours, we lost 
what we had built, little by little, in 50 years.” 
Early estimates indicated that $5 billion would be necessary for reconstruction, which meant 
that even with millions of aid dollars pouring in, much of the reconstruction burden would have to be 
borne by local communities (ECLAC 1999; Ranganath 2000; Rodgers 1999). Furthermore, the 
country’s bread-winning economic sector – in terms of foreign exchange – took a heavy hit from the 
storm and slid into rapid economic decline. In the northern Sula valley, flooding wiped out nearly 
three-quarters of the banana plantations and production plummeted to roughly one-fifth of Pre-Mitch 
levels, forcing Dole and Chiquita to lay off 25,000 workers (EIU 2004a). Yet what distinguished 
Hurricane Mitch from other natural disasters were the almost unimaginable human costs: 7,000 
deaths, 8,000 “missing,” 1.5 million made homeless, and many more left without access to basic 
public services (CRED-OFDA 2005: EIU 2004a). As time wore on, Mitch also exposed underlying 
vulnerabilities in the country’s “soft” infrastructure. Overcrowded schools functioned as shelters and 
medical stations, but were unable to stem a massive outbreak of deadly disease. Days after the rains 
ended, a “silent” disaster of disease quickly consumed the nation. Swollen and surging floodwaters 
carried excess waste and corpses through the country’s water supplies, and cracked sewage pipes and 
latrines seeped into the floodwaters, creating an ideal breeding ground for epidemics. Diarrhea, a 
result of dehydration and contaminated water (and the leading cause of death in children worldwide), 
was commonplace. Leptospirosis, a bacterial infection spread by rodents and exposure to water 
contaminated with animal urine, also affected large numbers. Mosquitoes began to proliferate in 
stagnant pools of water, boosting the transmission of vector-borne dengue fever and malaria. 
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Ultimately, health officials believe 20,000 people contracted cholera, 31,000 became infected with 
malaria, and diarrhea affected an additional 208,000.  
Media coverage of the issue was mainly through on-the-spot television transmissions and radio 
broadcasts. Foreign correspondents ‘flooded’ the country, and US reporting on the disaster – in its 
‘own backyard’ – dominated media coverage. One of the authors (Boykoff) was living along the 
Choluteca River in Southern Honduras, and witnesses firsthand how news pieces were reported 
mainly through foreign correspondents, where international coverage then effectively mediated local 
interpretations of local and regional events. Understandably, throughout coverage of the disaster, the 
focus was on the immediate: again, where the macro- and long-term was foregone in favor of the 
micro- and short-term crises at hand. Importantly, Boykoff anecdotally found little media discussion 
of adaptation preceding the storm, thereby contributing to the challenges faced when the storm struck. 
Overall, the case of Honduras clearly illustrates why poorer nations are at a “structural disadvantage” 
in preparing for, coping with, and responding to hydro-meteorological disasters. Countries with 
colonial legacies of extraction are structurally predisposed toward higher levels of social, economic, 
and institutional vulnerability because they suffer chronically from declining terms of trade, 
commodity price volatility, and low levels of internal integration, degraded natural environments, 
weak civil societies, feeble domestic institutions, high domestic inequality, and large informal sectors. 
            The infrastructure of media sources faces political economic and distribution challenges. 
Moreover, there has been little coverage of environmental issues such as climate change, particularly 
in the national newspapers La Tribuna, La Prensa, El Heraldo and Tiempo. This is due to 
aforementioned factors in news production such as insufficient journalist training, and the preference 
for more concentrated, and dramatic stories on crime/accidents.  In the case of media coverage of 
climate adaptation, scant coverage – attributed in part to journalist training, the nature of the story, 
different priorities – did not help before, during or after the storm. Rather, it could be argued that this 
exacerbated detrimental impacts. The additional colonial legacy of weak media institutions feeds into 
ongoing challenges in media coverage of climate change. 
 
THE THIRD PHASE of personal engagement with climate change via mass media 
Figure 6 shows the third ‘phase’ of communication in the Carvalho and Burgess model, which focuses 
on the consumption of news media coverage of climate change – both mitigation and adaptation – in 
the personal sphere. This is a phase where these public discourses permeate and integrate to varying 
degrees into personal understanding and behavior. William Ruckelshaus – first US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) administrator – has said, “If the public isn’t adequately informed [about 
climate change], it’s difficult for them to make demands on government, even when it’s in their own 
interest” (Ruckelshaus 2004). But how this information is interpreted and translated into decisions and 
potential behavioral change is complex, dynamic and contested. 
In theorizing interactions at the science-practice interface, researchers have considered three 
main ‘waves’ of engagement (Collins and Evans 2002). The first wave of interactions was that of a 
‘deficit model’ approach to understanding interaction. This perspective posited that poor choices and 
actions were attributed to ‘deficits’ of knowledge and information to make the ‘correct’ choice. The 
approach was associated with norms and ideals of science as open, universal and objective practices. 
However, this set of ideal interactions is much more complicated in practice. Since the 1950s, this 
view has been critiqued (within science studies) for being too simple a characterization of the dynamic 
interactions between science and policy/practice. However, in the policy and public spheres, there are 
residual impulses such as the stated reliance on ‘sound’ science in order to make decisions, as well as 
the stated pursuits to eliminate uncertainty as a precondition for action. The second wave of 
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engagement is considered the wave of ‘democracy’. Ulrich Beck examined the democratization of the 
science-practice interface, particularly in his book ‘Risk Society’ (Beck 1992). There he posited that 
there are common ‘bads’ in our risk society as well as common ‘goods’: techno-economic 
development itself could actually increase problems in practice rather than solve them. He called for 
more non-state actor/policy/public engagement and feedback into the processes of science (or 
‘upstream engagement’) in order to more properly account for and deal with the contested spaces of 
(public and private) engagement with science. The third wave is called the ‘normative theory of 
expertise’. It is similar to the second wave in terms of the democratizing commitments, though it 
further maps institutional boundaries between formalized science-policy/politics and the lay public. 
This theoretical move seeks to delineate the variegated roles of generally legitimized and authorized 
‘experts’ vis-à-vis specialist ‘experts’ in the field in question. In other words, in the case of climate 
change, this modeling seeks to clarify which groups and institutions may be ‘authorized’ speakers on 
climate science, while others are not (Collins and Evans 2002). 
Research on public understanding of climate change has burgeoned in recent years. A subset of 
this work has examined how media representations of climate change influence ongoing science-
practice interactions. A salient focus has been on representations of uncertainty. Scientists often have 
difficulty placing the uncertainty associated with their research into a familiar context, through an 
appropriate analogy; in other words, “translating error bars into ordinary language” (Pollack 2003, 77). 
Scientific uncertainty has entered debates regarding action, sometimes serving to inspire inaction 
(Demeritt 2001); it is an inherent element in all scientific inquiry. A study of US newspaper and 
magazine coverage from 1986 through 1995 – in The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The 
Chicago Tribune, and The Los Angeles Times and unspecified magazines from the popular press –
found that uncertainty was consistently prominent theme in reporting. It concludes that uncertainty 
“was used to help construct an exclusionary boundary between ‘the public’ and climate change 
scientists” thereby contributing to deferential citizens and diffused public involvement through 
acceptance of the need for ‘more research’ (Zehr 2000, 85). In practice, the mass media have 
effectively amplified uncertainty through coverage of climate contrarians’ counter-claims regarding 
anthropogenic climate change (Wilkins 1993; Zehr 1999; McCright 2007), without providing context 
that these claims have been marginalized in the climate science community (Schneider 1993; 
Dunwoody 1999). Clearly, this can distract from further engagement with climate adaptation issues. 
Research by Corbett and Durfee (Corbett and Durfee 2004) examined coverage of climate change with 
a focus on uncertainty. Through an experiment design of three newspaper story treatments – 
controversy, context and control (neither context nor controversy) – they found that greater 
contextualization within climate science stories helps to mitigate against controversy stirred up 
through uncertainty. Thus, reader perceptions were affected by the sometime subtle characteristics 
(mentioned in the ‘first phase’ above). In regards to public understanding of climate adaptation, this 
information on how content impacts reader comprehension is useful. 
Connected to content, a number of polls have queried reader comprehension of climate change 
For instance, Bord, O’Connor and Fisher conducted a survey to investigate links between knowledge 
of climate change causes and behaviors (2000). Through 1,218 surveys, they found that increased 
understanding also increases people’s stated intentions to do something about it. Providing greater 
texture to analysis of public perceptions and actions in regards to climate change, a study of beliefs 
and attitudes about the severity of climate change was undertaken in 1997 and 1998 (Krosnick et al. 
2006). Through telephone interviews of 1,413 adults, they found that beliefs were a function of three 
main factors: possible relevant personal experiences (e.g. exposure to weather disasters), perceived 
consequences of climate change (e.g. relative vulnerability) and messages from informants (e.g. 
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scientists via the mass media). Through this empirical research, the authors put forward a mechanism 
linking knowledge and action: “knowledge may have increased certainty, which in turn increased 
assessments of national seriousness, which in turn increased policy support…knowledge about an 
issue per se will not necessarily increase support for a relevant policy. It will do so only if existence 
beliefs, attitudes, and beliefs about human responsibility are in place to permit the necessary reasoning 
steps to unfold” (Krosnick et al. 2006, 36-37). Among a number of important research projects carried 
out in this area by Leiserowitz (that I anticipate he will outline in his associated background paper), a 
2006 national survey in the US sought to examine climate risk perceptions via affect, imagery and 
values. Through 673 surveys, he found that respondents perceive climate change as a moderate risk, 
melting glaciers and polar ice were the most prominent images associated with climate change, and bi-
partisan support for GHG reduction policies at the international and national levels (Leiserowitz 
2006). However, the study found a disconnect between broad support for policy action and support for 
policies that could potentially curb individual behaviors related to GHG emissions (such as higher gas 
prices), and this was influenced most strongly by values (from egalitarian to hierarchical and 
individual to communal). He concluded that “messages about climate change need to be tailored to the 
needs and predispositions of particular audiences; in some cases to directly challenge fundamental 
misconceptions, in others to resonate with strongly held values” (Leiserowitz 2006, 64). This 
association with values was also a strong feature that influenced views of the 1997 debate on climate 
mitigation action. Surveys of 1,413 adults found that despite about half of respondents seeing 
television news coverage of climate change debates on Kyoto action in 1997, few of their opinions on 
the issue changed (Krosnick et al. 2000). Furthermore, a psychological study of 76 experimental 
subjects found a preference for mitigation of GHG emissions (“undoing the effects of global 
warming”) over adaptation measures (“providing…economic assistance”). There was also a 
demonstrated preference for helping people in one’s own country before people in other countries 
(Baron 2006, 146). These studies provide important evidence on the critical need for accurate 
information and active education of the populace to facilitate climate adaptation, keeping in mind the 
aforementioned complexities. Furthermore, these studies point out the importance of perspectives and 
preferences in determining which climate mitigation and adaptation strategies may be more readily 
accepted, and therefore more successful.  
Other studies have investigated the kinds of engagement that people have had with climate 
information. Wilson conducted 649 surveys of university students in 1992 in order to explore this 
question. Results showed that approximately half of students indicated that media was their primary 
source of global warming knowledge. Within media, ‘national television news’ was the most frequent 
source (Wilson 1995). Another study of 100 university students in 1997, along with a telephone survey 
of 512 adults was undertaken to explore pathways of understanding climate change causes, 
consequences and solutions. This study found that newspapers and television were reported to be the 
most frequent sources of information about global warming and that this was linked to understanding 
of the connections between fossil fuel use and climate change (Stamm et al. 2000). There have also 
been many polls asking where people are accessing scientific information within the media. For 
instance, a 2006 Pew Study found that television is the primary source of information, and the internet 
is the second most utilized source (Pew Internet and American Life Project 2006). Furthermore, the 
poll found that 65% of respondents report that they have come across science news when using the 
internet for other reasons, and just half of those using the internet for science information have gone to 
a website whose content is devoted to science (Pew Internet and American Life Project 2006). These 
findings relate to work by Sheldon Ungar (1992, 2000). He asserts that there exists a paradox where 
increases in specialized knowledge lead to more compartmentalized groups of understanding. 
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Moreover, he argues that the issue of climate change lacks the day-to-day relevance necessary to 
motivate people to learn and take action, and that this arena remains a contested space of knowledge, 
understanding and ‘appropriate’ action, as efforts to overcome these challenges can be problematic. 
Ungar concludes, “bridging metaphors can be inappropriate or misapplied, (so) the public could very 
well be concerned but relatively ill informed about such issues” (Ungar 2000, 309). Therefore, there is 
a need for accurate communications that reach beyond ‘conventional’ science communications; 
however, this necessity comes with numerous challenges (outlined above). 
Connected to this, a number of polls have also explored public understanding of climate 
change more generally. For instance, an MIT study found that climate change is poorly understood 
overall. Through a 17-question internet survey, 1,200 participants responded to questions regarding 
climate change, and more specifically, mitigation technologies. In ranking ‘high-priority’ 
environmental issues for the public, ‘global warming’ ranked sixth (Herzog et al. 2005). Within this 
issue, Yale University conducted a poll regarding connections between energy technologies and 
climate change. Through 1002 interviews, the poll found that while an overwhelming number of 
respondents (93%) stated that they want government to work on breaking the links between energy use 
and environmental harm (Yale University School of Forestry and Environmental Studies 2005). In 
2007, the Nielson Company conducted a poll of 25,408 internet users across 46 countries, where they 
asked participants questions that referred to global warming.
9 Three key limitations may have affected 
and pervaded responses: 1) varying levels of acquiescence, 2) differentiated cultural interpretations of 
the term ‘global warming’, and 3) different socio-economic and educational levels of internet users in 
each country that may deem these response sets unrepresentative of larger public understanding in 
various countries. Nonetheless, the responses provide insights into public understanding and 
engagement with climate change, and the scope of the poll is unparalleled. The survey asked ‘what is 
your biggest concern’ as well as ‘your second biggest concern’ in ‘the next six months’? It also asked 
the question ‘have you heard or read anything about the issue of global warming?’ and, ‘from what 
you have heard or read about global warming, what do you think is causing it?’ Overall, Latin 
Americans and Europeans were found to be the most aware as well as the most concerned about 
climate change. On the other side, North Americans were reported as the least aware and least 
concerned (The Nielsen Company 2007).  
Table II provides abbreviated results from the surveys with country, age and gender 
breakdowns. This Table II is constructed to be consistent with the countries explored in Table I and in 
Figures 1 and 3. Many insights can be drawn from this robust data set. Among them are the following: 
•  Males report that they have heard or read something about the issue of global warming as much or 
more than females in 21 of these 24 selected countries (the exceptions are Thailand, India and 
United Arab Emirates) 
•  Females express global warming as biggest/second biggest concern as much or more than males 
67% of the time (32 of 48 cases) 
•  Males attribute causes of global warming to ‘natural changes’ slightly more frequently than 
females, in these selected countries 
•  People in their 30s and 40s in these countries were least often the ages groups who considered 
global warming as biggest/second biggest concern over the next 6 months (evident in 7 of 48 
cases, or 15%) 
                                                 
9 The 46 countries were: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czechs Republic, Denmark,  
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, NZ, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Thailand, Singapore, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, UAE, UK, U.S. and Vietnam. 
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•  People in their teens and 20s appeared to be the least informed about the issue of global warming 
in these selected countries. 
•  People over the age of 40 most frequently stated ‘natural changes’ as the cause of global warming 
in these countries (12.5%; the exceptions were Japan, Korea and Thailand) 
•  While respondents under 20 in Japan are the group who express most concern over global warming 
in the next 6 months, they are also the group least informed about it (61% have heard or read about 
it), or misinformed (see bullet point above). This draws attention to both the apparent opportunity 
and need to reach younger Japanese with accurate information on climate change.  
•  The two countries in Phase I of Kyoto Protocol who have not ratified – Australia and US – do not 
show evidence that their populations are least concerned; Australians actually had the highest 
percentage of people who expressed global warming as their biggest/second biggest concern 
Analyses of other polls have also been undertaken in peer-reviewed literature. In a 2006 article, 
Lorenzoni and Pidgeon’s findings concur with the Nielsen results. Through analyses of fifteen years of 
climate-change perception polling and research, they found that despite concern for climate change, it 
is an issue of lesser immediate importance than other daily issues. From this evidence, they state, “a 
risk communication strategy based on providing scientifically sound information alone…will not be 
sufficient in itself. Perceptions of climate change are more complex, defined by varied 
conceptualizations of agency, responsibility and trust. Successful action is only likely to take place if 
individuals feel they can and should make a difference, and if it is firmly based upon the trust placed 
in government and institutional capabilities for adequately managing risks and delivering the means to 
achieve change” (Lorenzoni and Pidgeon 2006, 88). Thus, the issue of public trust in governance 
emerged as an important feature of climate change action. Moreover, there is an inherent difficulty in 
dealing with the issue of climate-change adaptation action when the costs are often concentrated and 
the benefits diffuse, relative to other daily concerns. This is supported by further risk perception 
research (e.g. Leiserowitz 2005; Lorenzoni et al. 2006) and more recent work on costs and benefits at 
the University of Purdue Climate Change Research Center (Patchen 2006). These contemporary 
projects are reminiscent of foundational sociological work across many issues by scholars such as 
Theodore Lowi (Lowi 1972). This is also mentioned at the beginning of this section.  
Within this contested space, it is useful to briefly consider non-state actors, or ‘claims-makers’ 
that seek to frame the issue in particular ways. It is worthwhile to seek to understand how non-state 
actors have gained greater discursive traction through the media, and, as a result, have significantly 
affected public understanding. These actors can range from ‘contrarians’ to environmentalist NGOs, 
all seeking to shift discourses on climate change via the mass media in both particular and general 
ways. An early analysis of claims-makers in the press examined coverage in five U.S. newspapers – 
the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, the Christian Science Monitor, and 
the Wall Street Journal – from 1985 through 1995. The study found that over this period, scientists 
became less dominant sources of information reported in the news (Trumbo 1996). This movement of 
sourcing from scientists to other actors is consistent with associated studies (e.g. McCright and Dunlap 
2003). In the US context, via the aforementioned survey data in 2002 -2003, Leiserowitz found that 
the interpretive community dubbed ‘alarmists’ only demonstrated a more prevalent demographic of 
being ‘young’. Meanwhile, those dubbed ‘naysayers’ – who believed that anthropogenic inputs to 
global warming are negligible and over-hyped in the media – were found to be largely male, 
Caucasian, Republican, individualist, hierarchical, and religious .  The same pattern has been found in 
the U.S. for acceptance of risk of all sorts (Kaloff et al. 1993).  Of particular interest is that naysayers 
reported to rely on radio as their main source for news (Leiserowitz 2005). In this work, Leiserowitz 
also acknowledges that these arenas of claims-making and framing are “an exercise in power…those 
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with the power to define the terms of the debate strongly determine the outcomes” (Leiserowitz 2005, 
1441), and then calls for a more democratized discourse, perhaps akin to the aforementioned 
interventions of Beck (1992).  
Research by McCright and Dunlap has focused on the opposition movement dubbed 
‘contrarians’ or ‘sceptics’ (McCright and Dunlap 2000; McCright and Dunlap 2003). This opposition 
speaks out stridently against the aforementioned consensus in climate science, and through this 
privileged access and power, has amplified uncertainty on human contributions to climate change by 
constructing the argument that human’s role is negligible. Freudenburg (Freudenburg 2000) discusses 
embedded power and leveraged legitimacy enabling privileged constructions of ‘non-problematicity’ 
in environmental issues more broadly. In their research, McCright and Dunlap examined three major 
counter-claims: 1) the evidentiary basis of global warming is weak/uncertain/flawed; 2) global 
warming will have substantial benefits; and 3) climate policy action will do more harm than good. 
They also examined links between contrarians and conservative think tanks, anti-environment 
movements and carbon-based industry. They focused on five prominent contrarians – S. Fred Singer, 
Robert Balling, Sallie Baliunas, Richard Lindzen, and Patrick Michaels. They juxtaposed their 
influence with the work and influence of five prominent climate scientists – Stephen Schneider 
(Stanford University), F. Sherwood Rowland (University of California-Irvine), Bert Bolin (former 
chair of the IPCC), James Hansen (NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies), and Benjamin Santer 
(Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory). Among their results, they found that in the early and mid-
1990s, these ‘contrarians’ gained increased visibility in seven major newspapers – the Los Angeles 
Times, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, USA Today, the Chicago 
Tribune and Newsday. Furthermore, findings showed that these dissenters successfully developed 
legible and competing discourses to disempower top climate science, and effectively gain a foothold in 
national and international discourse on the causes of climate change (McCright and Dunlap 2000; 
McCright and Dunlap 2003). 
To date, there is little peer-reviewed work that has examined how climate NGOs have 
influenced climate change discourse via the mass media. However, a key study of NGOs in debates on 
environmental science and knowledge inform the case of climate change. For instance, researchers 
conducted twenty-one semi structured, in-depth interviews with UK NGOs around the issue of waste – 
Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, World Wildlife Fund, Green Alliance, Women’s Environmental 
Network, Forum for the Future, the National Society for Clean Air, the Environmental Services 
Association, Business in the Environment, the Industry Council for Packaging and the Environment, 
and the Paper Federation. Their findings show that while NGOs still rely on the authority of science, 
the more contemporary spaces of science-policy interactions (see above on ‘the second wave of 
science studies’) allow for greater NGO access as legitimate claims-makers. In drawing lessons from 
their case-study, the authors make the point that across other environmental issues, “many challenges 
are not strategic but contextual…expertise built around one boundary does not automatically transfer 
to another” (Eden, Donaldson et al. 2006:1074, emphasis added). This analysis, along with others (e.g. 
(Yearley 1996) help illuminate ongoing challenges as well as opportunities facing traditional as well 
as emergent actors in the arena of media and climate science-politics.   
More specific to climate change, Newell has examined the role of environmental pressure 
groups in shaping the climate policy terrain. He focused on the Climate Action Network, which is a 
consortium of over sixty NGOs such as Greenpeace, World Wildlife Fund and Environmental 
Defense. He found that environmental NGOs “constitute an important force for political change by 
helping to overcome social inertia and bureaucratic resistance to policy (action)” (Newell 2000, 152). 
As this NGO voice has grown, some scientists and journalists have raised concern in recent months 
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regarding NGO movements that push climate change discourse in the media beyond the parameters of 
what science can currently claim. This has been characterized in various ways such as ‘catastrophism’ 
by Mike Hulme, Director of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research in the UK (Hulme 2006) 
or ‘alarmism’ in the IPPR report ‘Warm Words’ (Ereaut and Segnit 2006) or ‘climate 
fundamentalism’. Hulme has written:  
Climate change is a reality, and science confirms that human activities are heavily implicated in this 
change. But over the last few years, a new environmental phenomenon has been constructed in this 
country – the phenomenon of ‘catastrophic’ climate change. It seems that mere ‘climate change’ was 
not going to be bad enough, and so now it must be ‘catastrophic’ to be worthy of attention. The 
increasing use of this pejorative term – and its bedfellow qualifiers ‘chaotic’, ‘irreversible’, ‘rapid’ – 
has altered the public discourse around climate change…it seems that it is we, the professional climate 
scientists, who are now the (catastrophe) skeptics. How the wheel turns…” (Hulme 2006) 
However, (perhaps to justify ‘alarmist’ NGO work to motivate action) previous work has revealed the 
effectiveness of such movements. A study of media coverage of global warming – in the New York 
Times, the Toronto Globe and Mail, Time, Newsweek, the Economist, Science, Nature, and the New 
Scientist – from 1987 into the early 1990s found that “social scares…accelerate political demands, 
(and) can be important sources of social change” (Ungar 1992, 497). Thus, the terrain of science, 
policy and the public via in the media in the issue of climate change – both mitigation and adaptation – 
remains a dynamic and contested one. 
  Overall, this section has examined the third ‘phase’ of communication: citizen awareness and 
engagement in the private sphere. We have surveyed how people interpret the influences of actors 
such as climate ‘skeptics’, and how citizens process communication of uncertainty vis-à-vis public 
trust. The material covered above is contested and debated in a number of ways, thus complicating 
efforts to be able to clearly and specifically recommend how media can better frame climate change 
issues – both mitigation and adaptation – in order to increase public understanding and action. For 
instance, a story on the plight of polar bears in the Artic can be inspiring to some people who put great 
value in biodiversity, yet could be off-putting to others who put particular value in the plight of human 
inequality (such as poverty in the Global South). Or, some stories framed as ‘what one can do to 
combat human contributions to climate change’ can be mobilizing for some segments of society to 
take action, yet can be de-mobilizing for others who do not have the tools, access or capabilities to 
make such changes. In other words, it is a complex set of interactions through time with no 
particularly easy answers. That said, there are some more straightforward steps that many 
communities, broadly construed, can take to help improve interactions. For instance, journalists can 
work to place stories in greater ‘thematic’ context, instead of moving from story to story in an 
‘episodic’ manner (see discussion in the first phase above). Moreover, journalists can work to label 
those quoted so as to make more clear to readers which statements could be influenced by special 
interests. For scientists, more consistent interactions with journalists and policy actors can improve 
background understanding of each of the groups about others. Furthermore, scientists can think more 
deeply about accurate metaphors and analogies that they can use in order to more effectively 
communicate their findings (and thus translate their work more effectively to the public). Policy actors 
as well as public citizens can improve their scientific literacy in order to more capably interpret news 
reports on the science of climate change, as well as stories on climate change mitigation and 
adaptation. These activities and endeavors can then help to improve public receptivity and engagement 
with climate change science, mitigation and adaptation strategies via mass media. In sum, the material 
covered above helps to inform how these complex processes unfold. These three phases of analysis 
now move discussions into the penultimate section of the paper. This section examines the history of 
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foreign aid for climate change, and reviews a series of studies on how reporting on disasters has driven 
aid agency budgeting. 
 
Media and foreign aid 
Since World War II, foreign aid has repeatedly been promoted as a key part foreign policy: as either a 
sound investment in national security, in addressing global issues like diseases and political instability, 
or for some as part of the need for international redistribution of wealth.  In 1970 before the UN, the 
major wealthy nations of the world promised to raise Official Development Assistance (ODA) to over 
0.7 percent of their Gross Domestic Income.  However, only a couple of countries have managed to do 
so, and some for only a few years.  Rather, domestic demands repeatedly take the will of politicians to 
send taxpayer funds to needy people abroad (who do not vote nor protest outside the presidential 
palace).  Still, development finance flies largely below the radar until a humanitarian disaster, a 
campaigning organization, and the media combine to raise the issue to national attention and pressure 
on funding agencies.  Occasionally there are academic studies and editorials about the ineffectiveness 
of aid (e.g. Easterly 2006; Burnside and Dollar 2000). These, however, often lead to only marginal 
changes in aid funding.  Major efforts like Live Aid and AfricaAid require substantial effort to pull 
off.  They sometimes succeed in the important task of raising consciousness about the need for 
international aid, but they just as often leave little of lasting impact.  
Aid comes in many forms, and each has important implications for adaptation to climate 
change.  Historically, the most funding went to “infrastructure aid” (Hicks et al. 2007).  These include 
roads, dams, and electrical energy generating systems: the most basic needs for further development.   
Much aid has been directed at promoting the increase of exports from development counties, based 
largely on the principle that these countries should trade on their “comparative advantage” in 
resources, land, cheap labor, and tropical climates.  Thus, aid agencies have funded the technical 
advice and inputs for farmers to produce traditional and “Non-traditional Agricultural Exports” 
(NTAEs) for marketing largely in wealthy nations.  Products like fresh fruit and vegetables, cut 
flowers, aquaculture-raised shellfish and meats all required significant investments for their 
production, processing, licensing, labeling, transport and marketing in stores thousands of kilometers 
away.  These products often require sanitary facilities for production, constant refrigeration, and 
highly coordinated lorry and air transport logistics.  The impacts of NTAEs have been substantial, but 
the effects of climate change on these food systems are highly understudied.  Many of these crops are 
far more water and agro-chemical input intensive than the crops they have replaced, but, aid has often 
assisted in building irrigation systems which reduce risks in the short term, at least.  However, 
marketing abroad has its own risks, as seen in some nations where some segments of consumers are 
shunning products with what they perceive as embodying “high food miles” or a poor “carbon 
footprint.”  For example, an October 2006 report by the International Institute for Environment and 
Development estimated that 50-60,000 small producers and another 50-60,000 employees were 
gaining their livelihoods from the sale of fresh fruit and vegetables to the UK alone (MacGregor and 
Vorley 2006).  Including dependents and service providers for the industry brought the estimates of 
the industry’s impact to 1-1.5 million people.   The concern is that efforts made to improve 
development benefits of exports (such as “fair trade” and “organic” labeling) will be undermined by 
climate change concerns of consumers.  
The media has played an important role in amplifying NGO concerns about international 
financial institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.  Starting in the 
1980s, protests by the Rainforest Action Network, Friends of the Earth, the Sierra Club, and 
Conservation International (among others) focused on the banks’ funding “mega projects” set up to 
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extract the natural resources or transform their natural landscapes with huge infrastructure projects like 
dams, mines, highways, airports, and vast agricultural schemes.  For example, the Polonoroeste and 
Carajas projects in the Brazilian Amazon came under intense scrutiny in the mid- and late-1980s and 
threatened cuts to those agencies’ funding sources (e.g. the U.S. Congress and the European 
Commission) drove some substantial reforms (Keck and Sikkink 1997; Neilson and Tierney 2003; 
Hicks et al. 2007).  Campaigning environmentalist and social justice groups have periodically 
continued to target high-profile funders of international development, especially the World Bank, the 
IMF, and the regional banks (ASDB, ADB, AFDB, etc.).  As a result, aid for infrastructure has been 
flat for two decades at about 30-40 billion a year, but represents a greatly diminished share of aid, as 
social, financial sector support, and environmental aid have all increased (Figure 8) (Hicks et al. 
2007).   
A few scholars have documented the role that the media plays in driving the allocation of 
foreign assistance to developing countries.  Douglas Van Belle and his colleagues have studied 
patterns of aid allocation in France and Japanese donor agencies, finding in each case that disaster aid 
has tended to follow patterns of reporting in major newspapers such as Le Monde, Asahi Shinbun, and 
The New York Times.  Rioux and Van Belle found that on average, one article in Le Monde “correlates 
with an additional US$77,000 in aid” to a recipient nation (Van Belle et al 2004). Each New York 
Times article was correlated with US$1.2 million in aid (Van Belle, Drury, and Olson 1999).  Both 
total foreign aid and disaster aid showed positive correlations with newspaper and TV coverage in the 
U.S. (Van Belle 2003).  For the analysis of Japanese aid, they broke coverage into total coverage of 
developing nations, negative coverage, unrest, need and positive and neutral coverage (Potter and Van 
Belle 2004).  Press coverage was significantly related to grants, but not loans.
10  
Based on these studies in Japan, France and the U.S., and ones in Canada and Britain, Van 
Belle and others argue that newspaper coverage of development issues influences bureaucrats who 
carefully watch issues in key daily papers.  Potter and Van Belle argue that the relationship is 
reciprocal—that bureaucrats influence the media at the same time as media coverage influences aid 
flows.  Rather than setting the agenda on aid, they and other authors argue that the Japanese media 
served a greater role in maintaining support for this funding.  Media is often used as a bellwether of 
public opinion in an area about which little is known, and bureaucrats seek to avoid internal and public 
critique by allocating aid where the media is focusing. Studying 5,000 natural disasters between 1968 
and 2002, Eisensee and Stromberg found that only10 percent were covered on the evening news 
broadcasts of major networks in the U.S. (ABC, CBS, NBC and CNN), and only about 20 percent 
received funding from USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (Eisensee and Stromberg 2007). 
There were massive imbalances in coverage of different disaster types: “for every person killed in a 
volcano disaster, 40,000 people must die in a drought to reach the same probability of media 
coverage.”  This is explained because famine is a ‘slow onset’ disaster, with little immediate and new 
dramatic footage of damage and suffering (see also Olsen et al. 2003), but race, class and region also 
play a key part. Stunningly, it requires 40 times as many killed in an African disaster to achieve the 
same expected media coverage as for a disaster in Eastern Europe of the same type and magnitude”   
(Eisensee and Stromberg 2007, 3, but see Mozambique case below, and Olsen et al. 2003).  Timing of 
a disaster was critical: occurring at the same time as other news crowding events like the Olympics 
made it much less likely a disaster would receive news attention and humanitarian disaster relief 
funding.  “To have the same chance of receiving relief, the disaster occurring during the highest news 
pressure must have six times as many casualties as the disaster occurring when news pressure is at its 
lowest, all else equal” (Eisensee and Strömberg 2007) (22-23, emphasis in original). These findings 
                                                 
10 GNP, trade, and East Asia variables were held constant. 
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were quite similar to a 2006 CARMA International study showing “no link” between the scale of a 
disaster and media interest in the story.” Further, most disaster coverage focuses on the suffering, and 
only a small proportion mentioned international relief efforts (CARMA 2006; Van Belle 2003).      
Hicks et al (2007) have shown that overall, environmental aid in general is driven by 
geopolitics and history as a colony of donors as much as environmental needs of recipient nations. 
Two of the best predictors in a multivariate model of environmental aid allocation from bilateral 
donors was whether the recipient nation had voted with the donor nation in the U.N. General 
Assembly, and whether the recipient was a colony of the donor (see Kuziemko and Werker 2006).  
The pattern varies, of course: Olsen et al. (2003) report that big donors like the U.S., France, UK and 
European Union use aid to serve their interests, whereas smaller donors (esp. Scandinavian countries) 
base funding on needs of recipients. The use of aid to “buy votes” has been recently admitted by 
Japan’s ambassador to New Zealand Masaki Saito, who confessed to their use of donations to Pacific 
Island nations to gain votes in the International Whaling Commission and attempt to overturn a 
decades-old ban on whaling. He said bluntly “…overseas aid is very good leverage so they can support 
our positions in general, including whaling.” (Associated Press 2003). Japan’s environmental profile 
has been much disputed, since decades of international action was based plainly on securing access to 
natural resources and increasing its global and regional power (see box).  In the late 1980s, Japan 
made significant about faces, including on environmental policy and the provision of aid for 
environmental projects around the world (Hicks et al 2007; Kim 2006). Aid agencies have been under 
pressure to show they are “doing something” about the environment, but this funding is constrained 
for a number of reasons.  Aid explicitly designed to address environmental problems has risen 
somewhat over the last few decades, but has largely leveled off at about ten percent of foreign aid 
(Hicks et al, 2007; Figure 7 below).  A second factor is that since sewage, water projects are so 
expensive, and because host governments most openly welcome such investments/aid, they tend to get 
the vast majority of aid funding. Climate change aid meanwhile remains a small part of that aid, 
reaching 1-2 percent of total foreign assistance over the past two decades. Further, aid for adaptation 
to climate change has been a tiny part of environmental aid.  Since the “debt crisis” of the early 1980s, 
much attention by campaigning social justice and environmentalist NGOs has focused on the large 
IFIs’ demands on poor nations to cut public funding for basic necessities and for their insistence on the 
privatization of basic services like water and health care. “IMF Riots” were documented around the 
world (Walton 1989). This combined with the pressure on aid agencies to stop funding 
environmentally damaging infrastructure projects may be seen as driving an increase in funding for 
“social” projects, including health care, education, government reform/capacity building, and 
agriculture (Figure 9). Not much of this debate has concerned adaptation to climate change; in fact, the 
coverage on adaptation to climate change in developing countries has been quite slim (see Liverman 
and Vilas 2006).   
After years of broadcasting images of starving babies on desolate African plains, “donor 
fatigue” has led many non-profits and international aid agencies to develop softer-edged requests for 
aid.  While popular media reporting on climate change continues to focus on apocalyptic report after 
catastrophic prediction, there is a similar attempt to shift coverage to include some hopeful solutions 
that do not leave viewers or readers at the point of despair and inaction.  For example, pre-Christmas 
appeals in UK newspapers called for modest donations to climate adaptation projects helping Andean 
and Himalayan families set up renewable energy systems and use more efficient wood stoves, saving 
tremendous ecological damage as well as time and effort previously spent hacking down natural 
forests and hauling back the wood. 
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InterAction, Global Health Council, Bread for the World and BetterSaferWorld.org 
commissioned a 2004 study in the U.S. on Developing Messages about Humanitarian and 
Development Assistance conducted by marketing firm Lake Snell Perry and Associates. Based on 
polling data and “message testing studies” from 2002 to 2004, they found that U.S. citizens believe the 
country should help the poor countries, but were “concerned about cost and effectiveness.”  There was 
marked scepticism about government-to-government aid, but “Coalitions of NGOs” were seen as 
trustable.  Positive language telling success stories and “helping individuals and communities help 
themselves” were seen to be more effective than scolding comparisons of American aid levels or 
images of suffering children.  Seventy-one percent of respondents said that U.S. government aid 
“assisting people in countries that are suffering from natural disasters” was very important, but it was 
fifth in a ranking, below preventing terrorism, education, and equality for women and girls.  On the 
other hand, it was first in a ranking of what were likely to be achievable goals.    
  No solid estimates exist on how much aid will be needed to assist developing nations in 
adapting to climate change.  Muller and Hepburn (2006) argue that we have at least an indication of 
the order of magnitude for such an estimate, which they put in the area of $10 billion a year.  They 
base their argument on the congruence of two estimates, one from Ian Noble at the World Bank and 
the other from their own extrapolation based on the first National Adaptation Programmes of Action 
(NAPAs) prepared by Less Developed Countries (LDCs) as part of their participation in the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change.  Both, in our opinion, are extremely inadequate, but 
require attention.  The World Bank estimates are the roughest, based on the examination of 50 projects 
of all types in 2003 and 2005, and an estimate on a 5-point scale of whether they were likely to be 
highly vulnerable to climate change.  Overall, they estimated that of the $100 billion of ODA and 
concessional finance, 25-50 percent was “climate sensitive,” and that adapting these projects to 
possible climate risks would cost about 10-20 percent of project costs.  This leads to an estimate on the 
order of $4-8 billion a year to make current aid projects less climate vulnerable.  They also provided 
estimates of the proportion of foreign private investment and domestic spending that will be needed to 
be “climate proofed” in LDCs to adapt to climate change, at levels around 2-10 percent of 
investments.  This came to another $5- $33 billion a year.  So adding these two numbers, Noble arrives 
at ranges of $9-41 billion a year. Note that this is only current projects, and does not address the 
“stock” of infrastructure or institutions that would need to be addressed.   
Muller and Hepburn (2006) also develop estimates based on the five National Adaptation 
Programmes of Action (NAPAs) which were available at the time of writing of their paper. (The 
current number of NAPAs on the UNFCCC website on 4 March 2007 is thirteen).  They found $131.5 
million in adaptation projects listed in the NAPAs from Bangladesh, Bhutan, Malawi, Mauritania, and 
Samoa.  Extrapolating to the Least Developed Countries, the G77 and China, and to all non-Annex-I 
nations, by population, GDP or land area, they developed an estimate of the funding needed to adapt to 
climate change between $5 and 9 billion per year. DFID, Oxfam, and other organizations are seeking 
to “climate proof” their portfolios of development projects; their estimates of how much this might 
cost may be enormous improvements over the top-down World Bank, and Muller and Hepburn’s 
NAPA-extrapolation estimates. A Tyndall Centre study reviewed “portfolio screening” of the climate 
sensitivity in development assistance at six development agencies: the World Bank, Norway, DFID, 
have screened their project portfolios (Klein et al. 2007). They found a shortage of good information 
inside agencies and a serious neglect of possible damage to initiatives from future climate change.  
Available funding for adaptation to climate change is grossly insufficient.  There are four funds 
under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and Kyoto Protocol.  The Least Developed 
Country fund recently stood at $68.3 million total pledged and provided.  The Special Climate Change 
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Fund was $56.5million, and the GEF Special Priority on Adaptation trust fund stood at $50 million. 
This totals under $300million total (not annually) voluntarily pledged for adaptation to climate change 
since 2001.  The Adaptation Fund had donations of only $5 million, but is projected to grow 
substantially with a 2 percent levy on the sale of carbon emissions reduction credits through the CDM 
(Clean Development Mechanism).  With a 2 percent levy, the 500 projects approved by the U.N. by 
February 12, 2007 will generate only about $3-12 million for the adaptation fund. Projections for the 
adaptation levy on the CDM vary wildly, from a total of $160 million to 950 million over the period 
from now until 2012.  Based on carbon permits at $5-10 a ton, our estimate is at the low end of this 
scale: $180-360million.   
One major problem with aid for climate adaptation has been defining what international donors 
should pay for.  Years of debate have focused on whether donors should cover only costs “additional” 
over what would have been done anyway, and only for “global” environmental benefit.  Adaptation 
financing is available only for incremental costs due to climate change (Muller 2007).   
There are some possible sources of new funds (beyond the CDM tax):  among them are a 
global carbon tax, more Official Development Assistance, an extension of the 2 percent levy to all 
carbon trading, and a levy on international air travel have been proposed. The airline levy idea of 
Muller and Hepburn is most similar to France’s solidarity levy on airline travel.  Three years ago, 
France unilaterally created a “solidarity levy” for HIV/AIDS funding to Africa financed by a 
progressive levy on airline travel (Leading Group 2006; Landau 2007). All these proposed means of 
generating the billions of Euros needed for adaptation to and/or compensation for climate change 
damage raise issues of what kind of public education campaign would be needed. National 
promotional organizations were set up by development agencies or NGOs in the 1970s in many donor 
nations, but development education efforts have waxed and waned over the past three decades, mostly 
falling into neglect in the 1990s. The new French airline levy recognized the important role of the 
media in supporting this new tax: the start-up of the levy was accompanied by release of stories to the 
press of the need and efficacy of this aid, and ticket-buying passengers were given literature to the 
same effect.  The strategic decision on the levy was to focus it intensely on a narrow set of initiatives 
providing key medicines through a new, streamlined, agency called UNITAID. 
One major advantage that raising funds for climate change adaptation and compensation may 
have over broader development appeals is the more direct connection between the actions of people in 
wealthy countries and the suffering of those in poor nations.  For example, taking a long-haul airline 
flight will create a measurable increase in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, which will add to 
problems in poor nations.  This is an intuitive application of the “polluter pays principle:” placing 
levies on key carbon-intensive actions on the basis of compensation and assisting adaptation.   The 
paying of voluntary carbon offsets by some airline passengers suggests the potential acceptability of 
these new fees, and concerns about their legitimacy suggest the need for rigorous independent 
monitoring and long-term control.  Aid generated by taxing carbon-intensive consumption ties the 
largest big emitters to the resolution of a “global public bad” (climate change), which affects everyone.  
Still, adaptation funding may be seen by some as a “local” public good, so substantial education on 
this will be required.  For us, this points to the need for a compulsory funding mechanism. 
 
Case Study: Japan – A Donor Who Has Rapidly Switched to Attention 
to Environmental Issues 
 
Japan started out as an aid recipient with its economy in ruins after WWII, but its recovery (with 
help from Western assistance) was so rapid that twelve years after the wars’ end, in 1957, it was 
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prepared to begin giving aid itself. From the beginning, Japanese aid was plainly described as a tool 
to help achieve Japan’s foreign policy aims. Among these aims were acceptance by other rich donor 
countries; mending political ties broken in WWII; and fostering pro-Japanese attitudes in countries 
that exported many raw materials to Japan (Rix 1980; Arase 1995).  Japanese aid became notorious 
for being composed mostly of loans instead of concessional grants, being designed for securing 
access to raw materials, tied to purchases from Japan of equipment and consulting services, and 
focusing heavily on strategic areas of Asia (Arase 1995, Rix 1980).  
 Japan is also notorious for its complex and opaque system of aid administration. It has never had a 
centralized aid agency or ministry; aid today is coordinated between some 13 cabinet-level 
bureaucratic actors, and technical cooperation, grant aid, and loan aid are handled by separate 
organizations (Kim 2006).  
Japan’s concern for environmental aid dates from the mid-1980s, and was a response to 
international criticism that its aid—focused as it was on heavy industry—contributed seriously to 
global environmental degradation, especially the destruction of tropical forests (Rix  1980). In 1986 
Japan’s Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) published a report recommending that aid 
include environmental assessment measures, a recommendation that was echoed one year later by 
Japan’s Environmental Protection Agency. This translated into diplomatic action at the Paris G7 
summit in 1989, where Japan made a major commitment to environmental aid of ¥300 billion (about 
$2 billion in 1990 dollars) over the next three years. In September of 1989 Japan hosted an 
international conference on environmental protection in Tokyo. Among Japan’s chief priorities were 
the protection of forests, urban anti-air pollution measures, and assisting the LDC’s in building 
resources to manage their own environmental problems, in keeping with the Japanese emphasis on 
self-help (JICA Annual Report 1993, Rix 1980). Before 1989, there was little mention of 
environment in the annual reports of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Reports 
after this date, however, all contain strong language on the importance of sustainable development 
and environmental priorities. The Rio conference in 1992 reinforced this trend, with Japan 
identifying the environment as a central consideration in policy formulation and making massive 
new commitments to spend ¥1 trillion ($8 billion in 1992 dollars) on environmental causes over the 
next five years. Japan also committed to spending on large-scale projects, such as a $500 million 
loan in 1990 for air-quality improvement in Mexico City, and to aiding middle-income countries 
that were the worst hit by environmental degradation.  
Even when environmental assistance was at its peak, however, it was completely dwarfed by 
the massive amount of Japanese aid that went for projects classified as likely to be environmentally 
damaging (Hicks et al. 2007). Infrastructure aid with likely negative environmental impacts did see 
a gradual drop over the 20-year period, from 71% of total lending in 1980 to 50% in 1999, but even 
in the mid-1990s this aid made up almost two-thirds of its total aid portfolio. Annual reports from 
JICA, while consistently emphasizing the need for environmental action throughout the 1990s, 
never once mention the idea of cutting back on lending to environmentally harmful projects. Japan 
did attempt to mitigate the destructive effects of projects such as dams, roads, and power plants by 
sending teams of environmental experts to judge their impacts, but such economic infrastructure 
projects were too firmly entrenched in Japan’s aid philosophy for Japan to consider reducing them 
(JICA Annual Report 1996, p 24).  
Throughout the 1980s, virtually all Japanese environmental projects were for water and 
sanitation (Hicks et al. 2007). It was not until 1990 that money for environment projects aside from 
water began to appear.  Japanese aid for global public goods like biodiversity conservation and 
climate change was extremely low until 1992, when it rose to about $350 million a year, and it 
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reached $500 million in two years later in the decade, 1995 and 1997.  The late-90s economic crisis 
led to deep cutbacks that hurt environmental aid sectors in two ways: funding fell and Japanese aid 
organizations were so overwhelmed with the Asian financial crisis that environmental issues are not 
even mentioned in JICA’s 1998 annual report, despite having their own section for the previous nine 
years. Given these trends, and recent admissions about allocating funding for votes on the Whaling 
Commission (see text), Japan’s position as leader in environmental aid is not at all secure. 
 
Case Study: Mozambique’s Typhoons and the Media in 2000 – “A 
model for future cooperation”?  
 
During the fall of 1999 and the first two months of 2000, a series of low-pressure systems and 
tropical depressions brought record levels of rain and extensive flooding to central and southern 
Mozambique. These precipitation events were followed by three cyclones: Connie, Eline, and 
Gloria. Torrential rains caused rivers and dams to brim over in Mozambique, and in Zimbabwe, 
Botswana, South Africa, and Swaziland. Because of the severity of the flooding, a number of 
neighboring states decided to release their floodgates, sending “walls of water” into Mozambique 
(Martin et al. 2001). The result: 700 people dead, 1 million displaced persons, 450,000 homes 
destroyed, 30,000 drowned cattle, 180,000 drowned chickens, 140,000 lost hectares of farmland (or 
10% of the country’s cultivated land), severely damaged infrastructure, and a $700 million 
reconstruction bill for the government (Martin et al. 2001; CRED-OFDA 2005; EIU 2004).  The 
media and aid agencies played a crucial role in the international response to the disaster, which can 
provide several lessons on the possible future impact of media on climate response. 
Mozambique is riddled with institutional and economic problems inherited from its colonial 
past. In 2000, UN-HABITAT estimated that 94% of the urban population lived in a slum dwelling. 
That means that close to all urban Mozambicans lack a permanent housing structure that complies 
with local regulations, electricity and sewer connection, and access to water within 200 meters. 
According to the most recent figures from the Global Urban Indicators database, only 5% of 
wastewater is treated in Maputo, building codes are not integrated with hazard and vulnerability 
assessments, and the environmental plan drawn up for the city has not yet been implemented (UN-
HABITAT 1998). The absence of these basic protections created ideal conditions for a human 
disaster when cyclones Connie, Eline, and Gloria arrived in early 2000 (Sidaway and Power 1995, 
1469).   
Four floods hit Mozambique in the terrible time of January-March of 2000: the first from 
heavy and early rains brought by climatic shifts under the La Niña pattern, then Cyclones Connie, 
Eline, and Gloria hit one after another. This description draws heavily on Christie and Hanlon 
(2001) and personal communication with USAID Director of Natural Resource Management David 
Hess.  In the city of Xai-Xai the Limpopo River waters were 12 feet deep for nearly a month, 
making it the worst flood in 150 years.  The Maputo and Umbelúzi rivers reached serious flood 
levels, as did the Incomáti, Save, Buzi and Púngoè.  On most of these rivers, the flood levels were 
two or four times what had ever been recorded. It could have been much worse, however.  Because 
of the changing La Niña weather patterns, heavy rains were predicted in Mozambique from 
September 1999 to January 2000 (Christie and Hanlon 2001, 106-108).  Some substantial planning 
went on to prepare for the floods, and weather forecasters worked to warn residents quite early on.  
After the early rains, soils became saturated and were unable to absorb more water. Still, the 
floodwaters swept through neighborhoods “like a monster”, entirely engulfing homes, schools, and 
train stations (Christie and Hanlon 2001, 1). 700 people are believed to have died.  Some people 
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survived by moving up into trees and tying themselves up there, some were stuck there for days or 
even weeks.  They drank the contaminated waters that flowed by, grabbing crops or anything else 
they could eat.  Finally, South African helicopters saved thousands of victims, as television cameras 
transmitted the dramatic rescues around the world. 
In their detailed account of the floods, journalists Frances Christie and Joseph Hanlon argue 
that the massive outpouring of foreign support during the aftermath of the floods was due to those 
televised images (2001; Martin et al. 2001).  Olsen et al. (2003) describe how reporters had nearly 
immediate and complete access to the disaster zones and dramatic relief effort: “the world had never 
before on TV seen a woman give birth to a child in a treetop…never before had TV shown such 
spectacular rescue.”  They document how the Mozambique floods received five times the TV 
coverage in Denmark and the international print press as did the much larger Indian cyclone disaster 
of 1999, where the media was shut out of disaster zones until international interest had nearly 
passed.  Suggestively, humanitarian assistance was seven times greater for the Mozambique floods.  
Christie and Hanlon describe a remarkably coordinated effort by the Mozambiquan navy, ten air 
forces, the Red Cross, and hundreds of other groups who worked together to rescue 45,000 people.  
Half a million people were supported in hastily constructed “accommodation centres.” Diseases and 
malnutrition were almost entirely averted (Christie and Hanlon 2001, 2.).  The Mozambiquan 
national emergency response agency (INGC) was remarkably prepared, and coordinated the rescue 
efforts with the help of foreign aid and emergency workers.  The UN World Food Program and the 
foreign assistance groups and air forces applied lessons learned from “coordination failures during 
Hurricane Mitch and in Albania.”  Christie and Hanlon report that the response to the 2000 floods in 
Mozambique was the “largest air rescue operation ever mounted” and “will be a model for future 
cooperation between humanitarian agencies and military forces” (Christie and Hanlon 2001, 4). 
 
Conclusions 
Overall, in the milieu explored in this document, it has been important to investigate mass media’s 
portrayal of climate change/global warming mitigation and adaptation. It has also been worthwhile to 
consider the role of media coverage as it relates to science and policy. In discussing mass media 
influence, Bennett has said, “Few things are as much a part of our lives as the news…it has become a 
sort of instant historical record of the pace, progress, problems, and hopes of society” (Bennett 2002, 
10). The survey above aims to help make sense of current trends, strengths and weaknesses of media 
representations of climate change, and thus assist in identifying and supporting potentially effective 
links that can be made to ongoing challenges of climate change mitigation and adaptation 
communications, as well as human development pursuits with the UNDP. 
This paper set out to raise a series of questions and point a few directions in beginning to 
answer them: What role do the media play in influencing personal, national, and international action to 
address climate change?  How much has the media covered climate change, and what is driving 
changes in that coverage?  How do climate change stories come to be reported, and who gets cited as 
legitimate sources in those stories?  What influence do the media play in forming public opinion? And  
a new awareness is to grow of the need for large amounts of foreign aid to help poor nations adapt to 
climate change, then what role can the media playing in mobilizing that aid?  
The core of the paper uses Carvalho and Burgess’(2005) framework of the “three phases” of 
news production, public discourse, and media consumption and personal engagement with climate 
change.  In the first phase we described how large-scale economic and political factors shape the 
production of news, as well as the norms and needs of journalists, editors, and producers such as 
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novelty and balance. In the second phase, we described how climate news stories compete (often 
weakly) with other more immediate issues for public attention, and how this leads to their marginality 
in national budgets, as public officials face voters concerned with local issues like crime and jobs. 
Anthony Downs’ “Issue Attention Cycle” would lead one to expect climate change to quickly rise and 
fall as a hot news story, but the issue continues to garner huge amounts of coverage, and there is 
significant debate in the “Public Arenas” about what the scientific findings mean.  The third phase 
examined citizen knowledge and engagement with the issue of climate change, and the influential role 
of climate ‘sceptics’ in paralyzing action.  Even without uncertainty about the human causes of climate 
change, people are often demobilized by feelings of isolation, hopelessness, powerlessness and lack of 
public trust in government to effectively address the issues.  We then examined the history of foreign 
aid for climate change, and reviewed a series of studies on how reporting on disasters drives aid 
agency budgeting.   
One could summarize from this review that the media has at times kept the issue of climate 
change alive, but has also limited the extent to which real change in the organization of society and 
foreign assistance have been called for.  To put it plainly, the press has been quite reformist in its 
portrayal of the needed action on climate change, when the scientific projections suggest the issue may 
call for truly revolutionary changes. The difficult position of the media in capitalist society is that 
commercial news outlets require huge amounts of advertising to pay their salaries and other expenses, 
and the greatest advertisers are for automobiles, real estate, airlines, fast food, and home furnishings.  
To create demand for real mitigation of climate change emissions would require the media to 
repeatedly and insistently call for truly revolutionary changes in society, precisely away from 
consumption of the products of their advertisers.  By comparison, creating pressure for the allocation 
of significant resources for adaptation to climate change will be relatively less threatening to the 
system that supports these media outlets. Whether that allocation will include sending funds to poor 
nations, of course, remains to be seen. To date in the studies and analyses outlined above, in some 
cases the media has been demonstrated to actually have played a role in hampering accurate 
communications about climate science to policy actors and the public via the media (e.g. Boykoff and 
Boykoff 2004). However, in other cases the role of mass media in communicating climate science, 
mitigation and adaptation has been mixed or more positive (e.g. Boykoff and Boykoff 2007). Thus, 
through the rich and broad range of studies outlined in this background paper, one can conclude that 
many challenges as well as opportunities lay ahead. Throughout the paper, we have sought to provide 
insights and details that substantiate this ultimate point.  
  There are clear needs for further research in this arena of climate science-media-
policy/practice, as mentioned throughout this background paper. There are numerous areas where this 
can (and should) be pursued. For instance, there simply needs to be more research specifically 
examining media coverage of climate change adaptation. To date, the aforementioned studies in this 
background paper have focused on either climate change generally or climate change mitigation (for 
example coverage of diminishing human contributions to climate change). Moreover, there is a clear 
need for more of this work to be extended into other countries, such as China, India and Brazil. 
Boykoff has examined U.S. and UK media coverage of climate change, and this survey notes other 
prominent studies also undertaken in the U.S. and UK, as well as countries such as Germany, France, 
Australia and New Zealand. However, analyses of media coverage in key countries in ongoing UN 
international climate policy negotiations can help to clarify ongoing impediments as well as enhance 
actions. There appears to be a new impulse of scientific and press coverage on the need for massive 
foreign assistance for adaptation to climate change, growing in part from the April 2007 release of the 
second Working Group of the IPCC’s report on climate change impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability 
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(IPCC WGII 2007). For instance, Revkin’s New York Times article ‘Poorest Nations Will Bear Brunt 
as World Warms’ has recently drawn greater media attention to the issues of inequality, climate 
change, adaptation and human development (Revkin 2007a). This was the case also with the follow-up 
piece entitled, ‘The Climate Divide: Wealth and Poverty, Drought and Flood: Reports from Four 
Fronts in the War on Warming’ (Revkin 2007b). The question is whether this new understanding of 
the need for adaptation will result in sustained and effective media coverage of the issue, increases in 
citizen action, NGO activity, national policymaker initiatives, and international agreement.  
Overall, the tools gained from the mapping of the terrain and the literature in the field of media 
coverage of climate change will help to identify key trends, strengths and weaknesses. It has been a 
challenging task for mass media to effectively cover this complex issue of climate change. As outlined 
throughout this document, there are external and internal pressures at multiple scales, both in the 
public and the private spheres over time. While reporting on the physical science has improved in 
recent years, coverage of the complex biological and human processes and activities (such as 
adaptation) is just emerging. Moreover, while coverage has focused on technical aspects (such as 
carbon sequestration), it has been more difficult to effectively cover moral, ethical and cultural issues. 
However, given the increase in quantity of climate change coverage overall, there are more spaces for 
quality coverage in these arenas. Many of these pressures and factors have proven contradictory (for 
example dealing with consumption questions amid corporate capitalist media organization pursuits) 
but some can be optimistically viewed as complementary (such as increased public attention on the 
issue and thus greater individual and well as collective engagement with the challenges therein). This 
background research aims to assist in the challenges of grappling with ongoing and interacting human-
environment issues, such as climate change, adaptation and human development.   
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FIGURE 1: English-language newspaper coverage of climate 
change/global warming                    
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This notes the increases in quantity of coverage of climate change and adaptation over time, also 
noting particular events, meetings and reports related to climate science and policy/politics/practice. 
 
Note: the  newspapers covered were the Sydney Morning Herald, The Age (Melbourne), the Courier-
Mail (Brisbane), The Australian, the Daily Telegraph (Sydney), Globe and Mail (Toronto), the 
Toronto Star, the South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), the Prague Post, the Irish Times (Dublin), 
the Jerusalem Post, the Jerusalem Report, Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), the Japan Times (Tokyo), 
Mainichi Shimbun (Tokyo), the Korea Herald, the Korea Times (Seoul), the New Straits Times 
(Wilayah Persekutuan), Het Financieele Dagblad (Eindhoven), the New Zealand Herald (Auckland), 
the Dominion Post (Wellington), The Press (Christchurch), the Moscow News, the Moscow Times, The 
Straits Times (Singapore), Business Day (Johannesburg), the Financial Mail (Johannesburg), the 
Sunday Times (Johannesburg), The Nation (Bangkok), the Guardian (London), the Observer 
(London), the Independent (and Sunday Independent) (London), the Times (and Sunday Times) 
(London), the Financial Times (London), The Herald (Glasgow), The Scotsman (and Scotland on 
Sunday) (Edinburgh), the Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, U.S.A Today (McLean, VA), the 
Wall Street Journal (New York), and the Washington Post. 
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The newspaper examined here are the Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal 
(New York), and the Washington Post and the television programs are ABC World News Tonight, CBS 
Evening News, NBC Nightly News, CNN WorldView, CNN Wolf Blitzer Reports and CNN NewsNight 
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FIGURE 3: English-language newspaper coverage of climate 
change/global warming AND adaptation 
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Note: The newspapers covered were the Sydney Morning Herald, The Age (Melbourne), the Courier-
Mail (Brisbane), The Australian, the Daily Telegraph (Sydney), Globe and Mail (Toronto), the 
Toronto Star, the South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), the Prague Post, the Irish Times (Dublin), 
the Jerusalem Post, the Jerusalem Report, Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), the Japan Times (Tokyo), 
Mainichi Shimbun (Tokyo), the Korea Herald, the Korea Times (Seoul), the New Straits Times 
(Wilayah Persekutuan), Het Financieele Dagblad (Eindhoven), the New Zealand Herald (Auckland), 
the Dominion Post (Wellington), The Press (Christchurch), the Moscow News, the Moscow Times, The 
Straits Times (Singapore), Business Day (Johannesburg), the Financial Mail (Johannesburg), the 
Sunday Times (Johannesburg), The Nation (Bangkok), the Guardian (London), the Observer 
(London), the Independent (and Sunday Independent) (London), the Times (and Sunday Times) 
(London), the Financial Times (London), The Herald (Glasgow), The Scotsman (and Scotland on 
Sunday) (Edinburgh), the Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, USA Today (McLean, VA), the 
Wall Street Journal (New York), and the Washington Post.
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(from Boykoff and Rajan 2007) 
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FIGURE 5: U.S. and UK newspaper coverage of climate change/global 
warming, 2003-2006 
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Note: This figure depicts the public arena of mass-media production, where journalistic norms 
interact. These complex and dynamic factors take place between and within (as well as feed back into) 
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TABLE II: global warming questions from 2006 Nielsen Global Omnibus survey  
Country  % stating global 
warming to be 
‘biggest concern 
over the next 6 
months’  
Total (male/female); 
age group of greatest 
concern 
% stating global 
warming to be 
‘second biggest 
concern over the 
next 6 months’ 
Total (male/female); 
age group of greatest 
concern 
% who have ‘heard or 
read anything about 
the issue of global 
warming’ 
Total (male/female); age 
group of least informed 
% who stated the 
causes of global 




age group of highest 
% reporting 
Australia  13 (10/17)  60-64  11 (10/11)  65+  93 (93/93)  < 20,   
21-29 
8 (8/7)  40-44, 45-
49, 50-54 
Canada  7 (8/7)  21-24  6 (7/6)  60-64  89 (92/85)  40-44  7 (7/7)  65+ 
China  1 (1/1)  55-59  1 (1/1)  65+  98 (99/97)  < 20  2 (2/2)  50-54 
Czech Republic   1 (1/0)  25-29  1 (0/2)  50-54  99 (100/98) 21-24  7 (6/9)  55-59 
Hong Kong  3 (5/1)  < 20  3 (2/5)  < 20  92 (95/90)  50-54, 
65+ 
2 (2/3)  50-54, 55-
59 
Ireland  4 (5/3)  65+  5 (6/4)  55-59  94 (96/90)  21-24  4 (3/4)  55-59 
Japan  3 (2/4)  < 20  5 (5/6)  60-64  85 (86/85)  < 20  5 (4/5)  25-29 
Korea  1 (0/1)  21-24, 
25-29 
1 (1/2)  40-44  96 (97/95)  40-44  4 (5/2)  25-29, 50-
54 
Malaysia  4  (4/4) 35-39 5  (4/5) 21-24, 
50-54 
75 (82/66)  < 20  4 (5/2)  50-54 
Netherlands  3 (3/3)  21-24, 
35-39, 
60-64 
6 (7/5)  50-54  93 (95/90)  35-39  10 
(9/11) 
55-59 
New Zealand  5  (3/6) 65+ 7  (7/6)  21-24, 
50-54 
94 (97/91)  21-24  12 
(13/10) 
60-64 
Russia  1 (1/1)  50-54  no data   no data  98 (98/97)  21-24  10 
(14/7) 
60-64 
Singapore  4 (3/5)  < 20  3 (3/3)  55-59  84 (86/81)  50-54  4 (2/5)  40-44 
South Africa  1 (1/1)  < 20  2 (2/3)  55-59  91 (94/86)  25-29  4 (5/3)  65+ 
Thailand  6 (5/7)  55-59  6 (4/7)  45-49  98 (97/98)  55-59  1 (1/1)  21-24, 35-
39, 40-44 
United Kingdom  7 (8/5)  < 20  7 (7/7)  < 20  92 (94/89)  25-29  8 (9/7)  55-59 
United States  2 (1/2)  25-29, 
35-39 
4 (4/4)  65+  83 (86/81)  40-44  12 
(16/9) 
45-49, 65+ 
Brazil  3 (3/2)  < 20  4 (4/3)  35-39  97 (99/94)  55-59  3 (3/4)  55-59 
France  12 (14/9)  61-64  15 (15/14)  45-49  97 (97/97)  21-24, 
25-29, 
30-34 
5 (5/5)  40-44 
Germany  3 (3/2)  60-64  4 (4/4)  < 20  94 (96/90)  21-24  7 (7/7)  65+ 
India  3 (3/5)  65+  5 (5/3)  < 20  90 (90/92)  21-24  6 (6/8)  55-59 
Indonesia  3 (4/2)  50-54  3 (3/4)  < 20  89 (94/79)  21-24  3 (3/1)  45-49 
Mexico  2 (2/2)  55-59  3 (1/4)  60-64  96 (98/94)  65+  3 (3/3)  60-64 
United Arab 
Emirates 
3 (2/3)  55-59  2 (2/2)  40-44  77 (73/81)  30-34  8 (8/7)  40-44 
 
NOTE: The first group of countries coincides with the aforementioned discussions of media coverage of climate change and adaptation  
(in TABLE I) (except for Israel). Other countries listed below are key players in ongoing UN climate negotiations. 
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